FIGHTING STARVATION IN BELGIUM

VERNON KELLOGG



FIGHTING STARVATION IN BELGIUM

HERBERT HOOVER

Chairman of the Commission for Relief in Belgium from the beginning to the present. Now also United States Food Administrator.

FIGHTING STARVATION IN BELGIUM

BY
VERNON KELLOGG
OF THE
COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM

ILLUSTRATED

GARDEN CITY NEW YORK
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
1918

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

Mr. Vernon Kellogg's connection with the Commission dates from May, 1915. He was Assistant Director in charge of Northern France from June to September, 1915, residing at the Great Headquarters (in Charleville) of the German Armies; Director for Belgium and Northern France from September to November, 1915, and from July to October, 1916, residing at Brussels, and Director-at-Large from November, 1916, to present, being variously in America, London, Rotterdam, and Brussels during this period. In connection with the Commission's diplomatic negotiations with interested Governments he visited Berlin, Paris, The Hague, and Le Havre (the seat of the Belgian Government). He also visited Warsaw to investigate the possibilities of the Commission's undertaking relief work in Poland. He is professor in Stanford University, California.

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CHAPTER ONE

BELGIUM BEFORE AND AFTER INVASION

BELGIUM is the most densely populated and highly industrialised country in the world. In proportion to its size it has more miles of railroad and carries a larger tonnage by rail and canal than any other country. Its population is 7½ millions and its area but 11,400 square miles (less than one-fourth that of the State of Pennsylvania). It has, therefore, an average population of 664 per square mile, which is nearly twice that of Great Britain, more than twice that of Germany, and more than three times that of France. It gains its living chiefly by the export and sale of manufactured products, depending on importation for 50 per cent. of its food supply (78 per cent. of its cereals). It

has twice the annual exports per capita of Great Britain, three times those of Germany or France, and four times those of the United States. Its imports per capita are twice those of Great Britain, three times those of Germany or France, and seven times those of the United States.

Belgium is a country and a people tied in the closest possible way to the countries and peoples outside of it; tied, that is, by the necessity of this union for the regular finding of its daily bread. It must have its wheat coming constantly in to make the bread—its money and manufactured goods going constantly out to pay for the wheat. That there may be money and manufactured goods to go out, it is also necessary that much of the raw materials for their manufacture come steadily in, for only part of these necessary raw materials are native.

About one-sixth of Belgium's population supports itself by agriculture, producing enough wheat to make bread for itself, and, besides, for a small percentage that works in factories which use native raw materials, and for another small percentage to act as shopkeeper and middleman to the two first named. The total grain production is about one-

Belgian refugees driven from their homes

Refugees receiving aid

BRAND WHITLOCK

United States Minister in Brussels. One of the Commission's "protecting Ministers," and actively connected with the relief of Belgium from the beginning. Honorary Chairman of the Commission from the beginning.

fourth of that necessary for the consumption of the whole population. Only to that extent is Belgium self-supporting. Therefore, if anything unexpected should at any time happen to shut Belgium off from the rest of the world, even for a short time, she would suffer, and, if for a long time, she would die—or most of her would.

Well, the unexpected something, to do just this shutting off, did happen in August, September, and October, 1914, and almost immediately Belgium began to suffer and a little later she would have begun to die if something else unexpected also had not happened to ameliorate this suffering and prevent this death. The two things that happened were the invasion of Belgium by the Germans and the relief of Belgium by the Americans.

The invasion of Belgium began on August 4, 1914. In ten weeks all the country was in the hands of the Germans, except that forever-famous little northwestern corner that for two years and a half has been all of the Kingdom of Belgium under royal rule, with its village capital of La Panne sheltering, in a simple, homely way, a royal family of imperishable memory.

The invasion resulted in an immediate severance

to a surprisingly complete degree of Belgium's commercial relations with all the world outside—except that part of it called Germany. And this single exception to the complete isolation of Belgium was one of abnormal character and no benefit to the people. For although food might have come into Belgium through this break in the enclosing ring of steel that shut Belgium away from the rest of the world, it did not; for Germany realised at once that she had none to spare. Also, Belgian money and manufactured goods might have gone out, and much did, but only in a way very shameful to Germany and of no benefit but only disadvantage to Belgium; it is a way that would be called burglary if it could not be called war. And not only did food not come in from Germany but—shame added to shame!—much already in Belgium actually went out; and not only did the product of factories go out without corresponding coming in of recompense in money or kind, but a great part of the raw materials in hand and for manufacture—and even machines for the manufacturing—went out also. So that Belgium's great factories immediately became still, her myriad tall stacks lost their usual adornment of smoke flags,

HUGH GIBSON

Formerly Secretary of the U. S. Legation at Brussels and an active supporter and member of the Commission; is now in the Department of State at Washington.

ÉMILE FRANCQUI

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Belgian *Comité National d'Alimentation et de Secours*. The active and responsible head of the great Belgian relief organization from the beginning to the present.

and her skilled workmen moved idly about, dazed and hardly understanding, in the great silent sheds of Liége and the Hainaut. The something that spelled disaster in red capital letters had come to Belgium and to the Belgians.

The ring of steel about Belgium was not all German metal. The German encircling probably would have been of itself sufficient to effect the commercial isolation of the country. But one must be fair. The English blockade of the Belgian coast, which became by the invasion essentially German coast, contributed English alloy to the metallic ring. The Belgians, perhaps, might have arranged to bring in foreign foodstuffs over their coastal border, but what the Allied Governments could not be sure of was that this food would be eaten by the Belgians. They had reasons to assume that it would not. To blockade Germany meant of necessity, then, to blockade Belgium also.

But the how and why of Belgium's isolation interested the Belgians much less than did the reality and the consequences of it. The Belgians are intelligent and quick-minded, and they saw at once what the unmitigated consequences meant. They

began, therefore, to move for mitigation. But they were rather helpless. They were subjects of German military rule. It is a kind of rule that, to be fully felt and understood, must be experienced. Perhaps it is not very different from any other kind of military rule. I do not know, as I have had no experience of other kinds. But I do know now, after twenty months of personal contact with it, what the German kind is. It is very effective, and its effects are obvious. They are most repellant to the mind of a free-born American. They reduce individuals to numbered units in a controlled mass; a mass that moves as harsh voices backed by loaded guns tell it to move.

The Belgians had become such a mass, and so their attempts to move for mitigation were pathetically trivial. That is, they were trivial in comparison with what the sequence of events revealed to be necessary. As a matter of fact, the Belgians of city, town, and village, over the whole land, rushed to meet the needs of the situation in a most beautiful and most capable way. I want later to try to do justice to the remarkable genius of the Belgians for local organisation, and to the beautiful generosity shown

by the more fortunate and capable to the unfortunate and weak, as revealed by the local relief work instituted everywhere throughout the country. Official effort and private initiative combined to do wonders, as far as wonders are possible to an imprisoned people. But the needs were too great; the resources too small. Other help was necessary.

Fortunately, the American influence toward amelioration could begin to be exercised at once, and it was.

Brussels has always had its American colony, and at the time of the invasion the members of this colony turned at once to the American Minister, Mr. Brand Whitlock, for help in their efforts to get home. When the Belgian court left Brussels for Antwerp, and later for Le Havre, part of the diplomatic corps followed it and part stayed in Brussels to occupy for the rest of the war a most peculiar position. Mr. Whitlock elected to stay. It was a fortunate election for the Belgians. Also it meant many things, most of them interesting, for the Minister.

When the American expatriates in Belgium applied to Minister Whitlock for help to become re-

patriates, he was able to refer them to three American engineers and business men resident in Brussels: Messrs. D. Heineman, William Hulse, and Millard Shaler, who arranged their financial difficulties despite closed banks, disappearing currency, and general financial paralysis. Started thus in relief work by the necessity of relieving Americans, they readily turned to the work of relieving Belgians: the more readily because they were the right sort of Americans.

In the very first days of August, even before the German forces had entered Brussels, Burgomaster Max of that city had decided to have the city acquire stocks of foodstuffs, to be held in reserve against the coming need. Indeed, King Albert and his Government had issued from the Belgian Great Headquarters, on August 14th, a decree fixing maximum prices at which various staple foodstuffs—such as flour, bread, potatoes, salt, sugar, and rice—could be sold, and giving the governors in their provinces and burgomasters in their communes the right to requisition, for the public benefit, the wheat and flour, and the potatoes, salt, sugar, and rice, respectively.

DANNIE N. HEINEMAN

Connected with Belgian relief from the beginning, and with the Commission at its founding. First Director in Brussels, October to December, 1914.

MILLARD K. SHALER

Connected with Belgian relief and the Commission from the beginning. Honorary Secretary of the Commission in London from the beginning to present.

As soon as the Germans had entered Brussels the outlook became critical. Communication with Louvain—where are situated the greatest mills of Belgium, the mills on which Brussels relies for much of its flour—was interrupted, so that it was at once impossible to continue to supply the capital with flour. Prompt action was imperative.

Messrs. Heineman and his associates saw that something must be done at once. They began to do it. In constant consultation with Minister Whitlock these energetic Americans suggested to Monsieur Émile Francqui—the most active director in the greatest private bank of Belgium, and a man of unusual brain and vigour—that an organisation be created having for its mission the aid of the poor of Brussels, the men and women hitherto self-sustaining but now out of work and out of income.

Conferences attended by Burgomaster Max, Messrs. Heineman and Hulse, Messieurs Francqui and Em. Janssen (a business associate and friend of Francqui), and other personages of Brussels, were held, resulting in the organisation, at the beginning of September, of a Central Committee of Assistance and Provisioning (*Comité Central de Secours et*

d'Alimentation), which was soon afterward placed under the patronage of the ministers of Spain and the United States (the Marqués de Villalobar and Brand Whitlock). M. Ernest Solvay, the richest man in Belgium and founder of the Institute Solvay, was made president of the organisation. The first regular meeting of the Comité was held on September 1, 1914. America was represented by Mr. Hugh Gibson, First Secretary of the American Legation at Brussels, and Messrs. Heineman and Hulse.

An executive committee under the presidency of M. Francqui was formed, and also a special sub-committee, under the presidency of Mr. Heineman, of eight members, of whom three were Americans, namely Messrs. Heineman, Hulse, and Macloskie (this last also an engineer associated with Mr. Heineman). It was the particular function of the sub-committee to have direct charge of obtaining and distributing the food supplies. The field of operations of the *Comité Central*, its executive committee, and sub-committee was so far limited to the city of Brussels and the communes immediately adjacent to it (*Agglomération Bruxelloise*).

The sub-committee immediately got busy, very

busy. There was plenty to do. Brussels carries normally no considerable stocks of food—that is, food staples—nor does any city for that matter. Belgium has a marvellous transport system; canals, railroads, and little narrow-gauge, light-rail, neighbourhood lines (*vicinaux*) that run along the country roads binding farms with villages and villages with towns. Anything anywhere in Belgium can be moved to anywhere else in the country in a few hours. One can go from Brussels, roughly in the centre of Belgium, to the boundary of the country in any direction in three or four hours. So Brussels and the other Belgian cities depend in normal times upon the steady movement of supplies, rather than upon their aggregation in any one place, for a constant supply of foodstuffs. Also in normal times there is a constant inflow of food from the outside world. We must remember always that Belgium depends on imported wheat for three-fourths of its bread.

But these were not normal times and the most serious thing that the sub-committee had to face—next, of course, to the absence of stocks in Brussels—was the interruption of communications, internal as well as external. There might be something of a

supply of flour in the great mills at Louvain, only half an hour away from Brussels by rail, but there were no trains making this half-hour run. Yet it was the business of the sub-committee to get hold of some of this flour and bring it to Brussels. Heineman was more than an engineer in the technical sense of the word. He was an engineering manager and a managing man of affairs. His committee therefore arranged to have the large motor trucks of the Brussels fire department put at their disposal. With these the flour was brought to Tervueren and there transshipped to the Brussels-Tervueren tram line which was under Mr. Heineman's control. He simply loaded flour instead of passengers into his little cars and thus staved off breadless days for Brussels as long as Louvain could let him have flour.

But the Louvain stocks were soon exhausted. Then the sub-committee ransacked all of the province of Brabant (in which Brussels is the chief city) and even other neighbouring provinces in its efforts to collect food for the capital. But what with the requisitions of the German army and the demands of the inhabitants of these provinces, there were already but small food stocks left, and the com-

mittee soon came to the limits of these. The time had come, indeed, when supplies from outside the country must in some way soon be brought in through the isolating ring of steel—or Belgium must begin to starve.

Steps were taken to this end, not only by those primarily interested in the provisioning of Brussels, but by the authorities of other Belgian cities in which the food problem was quite as grave as in the capital. Burgomaster Max wrote, on September 7th, to Major General Lüttwitz, the German military governor of Brussels, requesting permission to arrange for the import of foodstuffs through the Holland-Belgium border, and the city authorities of Charleroi also began negotiations with the German authorities in their province (Hainaut) to the same end. The Americans of the provisioning sub-committee decided, as neutrals, to take up personally with the German military authorities the matter of arranging imports. The neutral standing of these Americans gave them a peculiarly favourable position to carry on negotiations with the German authorities, and in them, together with Minister Brand Whitlock and his active First Secretary, Mr. Hugh Gib-

son, and the Spanish Minister, the Marqués de Villalobar, may be recognised the germ of the later great neutral organisation known now to all the world as the Commission for Relief in Belgium.

A general permission for the importation of foodstuffs into Belgium by way of the Dutch frontier was finally obtained from the German authorities, together with their guarantee that all such imported food would be entirely free from requisition by the German army. This first guarantee from the Germans was originally made directly to Heineman and Hulse, but was confirmed later to the protecting Ministers. Also, a special permission was accorded Mr. Shaler to go to Holland and, if necessary, to England to try to arrange for the purchase and transportation to Belgium of certain kinds and quantities of foodstuffs.

Mr. Shaler's passports were obtained on September 19th, but owing to delay forced by the German authorities at Liége (it was practically imprisonment) and the general difficulties of movement, he did not reach Rotterdam (travelling by motor) until September 25th. He immediately began negotiations through the American Minister at The Hague,

Dr. Henry Van Dyke, for the purchase of food in Holland, but although given permission to make these purchases in Holland if necessary, the Dutch Government urged that they be made in England, as Holland had need of all the food within her country. The Dutch Government offered to facilitate the transport through their country to Belgium of any foodstuffs bought in England. Mr. Shaler thereupon went on to London.

There, on September 29th, in company with Mr. Gibson, the Secretary of the American Legation in Brussels, who followed Mr. Shaler to London, he saw Count Lalaing, the Belgian Minister to England, and explained to him the situation in Brussels and his own special mission. Messrs. Shaler and Gibson also handed to the Minister a memorandum pointing out that there was needed a permit from the British Government allowing the immediate exportation of about 2,500 tons of wheat, rice, beans, and peas to Belgium. Mr. Shaler had brought with him from Brussels money provided by the Belgian *Comité Central* sufficient to purchase about half this amount of foodstuffs.

The Belgian Minister transmitted the request for

a permit to the British Government on October 1st. On October 6th he received a reply which he, in turn, transmitted to the American Ambassador in London, Mr. Page. This reply from the British Government gave permission to export foodstuffs from England through Holland into Belgium, under the German guarantees that had previously been obtained by Mr. Heineman's committee, on the condition that the American Ambassador in London, or Americans representing him, would ship the foodstuffs from England, consigned to the American Minister in Brussels; that each sack of grain should be plainly marked accordingly, and that the foodstuffs should be distributed under American control solely to the Belgian civil population. This official authorisation contained no mention of specific quantities and was interpreted by Mr. Shaler to be a permission without limit as to amount.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ORIGIN AND ORGANISATION OF THE COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM (C.R.B.)

MR. SHALER sought to interest the more influential Americans in London in the Belgian work and, through Mr. Edgar Rickard, an American engineer, he was introduced to Mr. Herbert Hoover, then the leading American engineer in London, who agreed at once to coöperate in every way with the American authorities and the British Government. Mr. Hoover was already conspicuous in relief work, as he had been the organiser and head of a special organisation called the American Relief Committee, created in London for the purpose of assisting and repatriating the 150,000 American citizens who found themselves stranded in Europe at the outbreak of the war. His sympathetic and most successful work in looking after the needs of these stranded Americans recommended him as the logical head for the new and greater philanthropic undertaking.

On October 7th, Mr. Hoover introduced Mr. Shaler to Ambassador Page, who, after a discussion, decided to cable the Government at Washington, outlining the British Government's authorisation and suggesting that, if the American Government was in accord with the whole matter as far as it had gone, it should secure the approval of the German Government. After a lapse of four or five days, Ambassador Page received a reply from Washington in which it was stated that the American Government had taken the matter up with Berlin on October 8th.

After an exchange of telegrams between Brussels, London, Washington, and Berlin, Ambassador Page was informed on October 18th by Mr. Gerard, then American Ambassador in Berlin, that the German Government agreed to the arrangement, and the following day confirmation of this was received from Washington.

The first formal step in organisation was taken by Mr. Hoover in enlisting the existing American Relief Committee (whose mission was then complete) in the new undertaking of Belgian relief, and in amalgamating its principal membership with the

Americans in Brussels, already active along this line. This was on October 10th.

On October 13th Mr. Hoover, in the name of the American Relief Committee, telegraphed an appeal to the American public to consolidate all Belgian relief funds and to place them in the hands of the American Relief Committee for disposal, outlining the situation which had arisen in Belgium.

On October 15th Minister Whitlock cabled an appeal to President Wilson to assist in the relief of Belgium.

Between October 10th and October 16th it was determined by Ambassador Page and Mr. Hoover that it was desirable to set up a wholly new neutral organisation. Mr. Hoover enlisted the support of Messrs. John B. White, Colonel Millard Hunsiker, Edgar Rickard, and Captain J. F. Lucey, all American engineers then in London, and these men, together with Messrs. Shaler, Hugh Gibson, and Clarence Graff, thereupon organised, and on October 22d formally launched, "The American Commission for Relief in Belgium," with Mr. Hoover as its active head, with the title of chairman; Mr. Heineman, as vice-chairman in Brussels; Colonel Hunsiker,

as director in London; Captain Lucey, director in Rotterdam; Mr. Shaler, secretary in London; Mr. Hulse, secretary in Brussels; Mr. Graff, treasurer; Mr. White in charge of purchase and transportation; and Mr. Rickard in charge of public appeals. Ambassador Page in London and Ministers Van Dyke and Whitlock in The Hague and Brussels, respectively, were the organisation's honorary chairmen.

The American Commission for Relief in Belgium became immediately and vigorously active in the acquirement of food supplies and the solicitation of public charity. It entered also into organising relations with representatives from various Belgian towns who arrived in London seeking food for different parts of Belgium. Of these Belgian groups by far the most important was one that arrived on October 18th composed of M. Émile Francqui and Baron Lambert, accompanied by Mr. Gibson. These gentlemen represented the Comité Central of Brussels. Their visit was the special outcome of events that had been taking place in Brussels. Things had been moving there as well as in London.

It had already become obvious that the situation in Belgium was no longer one local to Brussels or to a

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WALTER HINES PAGE

U. S. Ambassador in London, connected with Belgian relief and the Commission from the beginning. Active in all diplomatic negotiations between the Commission and the British Government. Honorary Chairman of the Commission from the beginning.

JAMES GERARD

Formerly U. S. Ambassador in Berlin, and active in all diplomatic negotiations between America, the Commission and the German Government. Honorary Chairman of the Commission from the beginning.

few of the large cities, but one that involved the entire country and people. All Belgium was crying for help, and more was needed in the way of organisation than a series of unconnected provincial, city, or village committees. A national organisation was required, and one that could have continuous powerful outside aid.

On October 15th the Brussels Comité Central had held a meeting to consider the establishment of an organisation of wider scope and one which should coöperate with the American organisation in London. At this meeting Messrs. Francqui and Lambert were delegated to proceed to London to confer with the Americans.

The meeting which took place in London on October 19th between Messrs. Hoover and Francqui was certainly one of the most momentous in the whole history of the Belgian relief work. Both men of large business undertakings and world-wide experience—they had, indeed, met in China several years before under most interesting circumstances—they were able quickly to formulate a basis of organisation and even the details and methods of arranging the large financial measures necessary to the operation of the organisation.

It was determined that the Comité Central of Brussels should reorganise as a Belgian national committee, with a sub-committee in each of the provinces, and that Americans should be despatched at once to Belgium to act jointly with the National Committee and the various provincial committees. Soon after M. Francqui returned to Brussels, therefore, the Comité Central formally made itself over (October 29th), with some changes, into the *Comité National de Secours et d'Alimentation.*

At nearly the same time the American organisation underwent a change of name. It remained, indeed, but four days under its original title. At the urgent suggestion of Minister Whitlock, Señor Don Merry del Val (the Spanish Ambassador in London), and Marqués de Villalobar (the Spanish Minister in Brussels), both of whom had been consulted in the arrangements in Belgium and London, were added to the list of honorary chairmen. A little later, also, there were added the names of Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador at Berlin; Mr. Sharp, the Ambassador at Paris; and Jongkeer de Weede, the Dutch Minister to the Belgian Government at Le Havre; and the name of the Commission was modi-

fied on October 25th by dropping from it the word "American."

The new organisation thus became styled: "The Commission for Relief in Belgium," which has been its official title ever since, although it has been popularly known under various names, as the "Hispano-" or "Spanish-American Commission"; the "Hoover Commission"; and, more commonly, the "American Commission" or, as used by the Germans in Belgium and North France, "*Das Amerikanische Hilfs-Comité.*" The Commission is usually called by its members, with characteristic American brevity, the "C. R. B."; and this name, pronounced "Tsay-er-bay," is perhaps the one most widely used by Belgians, French, and Germans alike.

The two organisations thus formed and named began to exercise at once that close coöperation which has existed between them all through the work of Belgian relief. The details of their inter-relations, a clear understanding of which is necessary to a comprehension of the whole relief work, will be pointed out subsequently; for the moment we return to the efforts to get the first food supplies from outside into Belgium.

While in London, M. Francqui secured an appropriation of approximately $500,000 for immediate use from the already existing Belgian Relief Fund. Representations were also made to the Belgian and the British Governments of the necessity for Allied government assistance. Through the aid of the American press representatives in London the new American organisation was made widely known to the American public, while through the British press it was given strong support throughout the British Empire, so that by October 22d money began to flow in from public charity. In the meantime the British Government decided to grant it an initial subvention of $500,000.

The American Commission had already begun to arrange for the purchase of 10,000 tons of cereals (wheat, rice, peas, and beans) and by October 21st these cereals, to the value of $400,000, had been purchased, and four steamers, one English and three Dutch, had been chartered for the transport of the foodstuffs to Rotterdam. On the next day, October 22d, the British Government informed the Commission that it would be permitted to buy grain only "in neutral ports and export it in neutral ships to



HENRY VAN DYKE

Formerly U. S. Minister to Holland, active in diplomatic negotiations between the Commission and Holland. Honorary Chairman of the Commission from the beginning.

MARQUÉS DE VILLALOBAR

Spanish Minister in Brussels. One of the Commission's "protecting Ministers" and continuously active in connection with the Commission's relations to the German authorities. Honorary Chairman of the Commission from the beginning.

neutral ports." No reference was made in this communication to the permission already given to export foodstuffs from the United Kingdom. The position seemed a little serious, but, by pointing out to the British Government the fact that the organisation had gone ahead in perfectly good faith on the basis of the earlier permission to make purchases in England, the American Ambassador succeeded in getting permission to ship the 10,000 tons of cereals already purchased.

The first shipment of 2,500 tons left London on October 30th. On October 25th, Mr. Shaler and Captain Lucey had left London to open an office of the Commission in Rotterdam. They arranged for the transport of the first shipment of cereals from Rotterdam by canal via Antwerp to Brussels, and on November 4th the first shipment of food from outside Belgium arrived in Brussels. But it was not chiefly several hundred tons of food that arrived in Belgium in those sealed canal barges: it was Hope and the promise of Belgium's safety from starvation that came.

This is a very sketchy account of the beginnings of the American relief of Belgium and the steps

that led up to the organisation of the great Commission. It is altogether too sketchy to do justice to the various persons who were associated with the enterprise or to give proper relative weight to the various events connected with the organisation of the work, and it omits more incidents in connection with this organising than it relates. But it must do for the moment. It is the work itself that we want to get to.

It has not been simple, this work; nor easy. It has been much more complex, and more difficult, and greater in extent than the popular conception of it imagines, and yet, paradoxically, it has been, in a sense, less, or at least less as regards one phase of it, than generally supposed. The Commission has not, as too widely believed in America, obtained all of the $300,000,000 worth (amounting in quantity to 3 million tons) of food and clothing it has sent into Belgium and North France, by charitable donation from the United States, nor even from the United States plus the rest of the world. Nor has it delivered all this food directly to the 9½ million unfortunate inhabitants of Belgium and North France

by the immediate hands of its American volunteer members. The total private charity of the world for the relief of Belgium and North France, put into the hands of the Commission as money or direct donations of food and clothing, has amounted to but $30,000,000, of which ten millions have come from the United States, and there have never been more than forty American Commission workers at one time in Belgium and Northern France.

But it is also true that all of the many million dollars' worth of money and donations in kind have been obtained and devoted to the relief of Belgium and Northern France at the instance and through the efforts of the Commission; and that all the supplies purchased with the money have been bought by the Commission in the markets of the world in competition with the buyers of all the Allied and neutral Governments, and transported by the Commission in hundreds of ships chartered by it across oceans controlled by warships, through the Channel strewn with mines and infested by submarines, and finally distributed by canals and railroads and *vicinaux* and carts all over 19,500 square miles of territory held in the close grip of a

hungry enemy army. And, lastly, it is true that the final getting of this food into the actual mouths of the 9½ million imprisoned people of this territory, by all the elaborate machinery devised to control the adjustment to individual needs and resources; the avoidance of fraud; the minimisation of the feeling of shame on the part of persons to whom living on charity was never before, or ever expected to be, within their experience; the special care of the children, the aged, and the ill—and all this without the loss of an appreciable fraction of the enormous food supply handled, by shipwreck or capture or seizure by the hungry enemy army, and at a total outlay for overhead expenses of less than one per cent. of the whole moneys handled—all this has been partly the actual work, and partly work done with the immediate collaboration and advice or final control, of the Commission.

There is, indeed, in the face of these two sets of statements of fact, a paradox that needs explaining. Fortunately, it is an explanation neither difficult to make nor hard to understand.

As Belgium depends on imports for half her

food supply, including three-fourths of her bread grains, it is obvious that the "relief of Belgium" meant much more than the relief of her poorest inhabitants, the providing by charity of food for her indigent and out-of-work people. It meant as well the making accessible of a sufficient food supply, especially of breadstuffs, for her entire population—rich and poor alike. However much money Baron this or Banker that might have and be willing to pay for food, barons and bankers and everybody else would have to go hungry if there was no food to buy. Or, if there was some food but not enough to go around, the barons and bankers would get it and the rest of the people would starve. There was necessary, then, not only a benevolence (*secours*) for the poor and workless, but a provisioning or revictualling (*ravitaillement*) of the whole country. The relief of Belgium would have to be, and it actually has been from the beginning, not only the collection and distribution of charity, but the obtaining, importing, and making accessible of such a supply of staple foods, above all breadstuffs, as, added to the limited native food produced, would keep alive the whole population.

It is in this extraordinary necessity that lies the explanation of the fact that although the Commission for Relief in Belgium has sent into Belgium and Northern France 300 million dollars' worth of food and clothing, it has supplied only 30 million dollars' worth from money or material received as donations from the outside world. The rest of the great sum necessary for this complete *ravitaillement* of the whole land has come from loans to the Belgian Government by England and France (since June 1 of this year by the United States) and by the results of the business methods of the Commission in connection with exchange, etc. Yet all of the great sum has been arranged for at the instigation and largely by the efforts of the Commission. Thus is explained the first paradox.

The other paradoxical statement—to the effect that there have never been more than forty American Commission workers at one time in Belgium and Northern France, who obviously could not hand out personally all the 3 million tons of food and clothing to the 9½ million individuals of the occupied territories, but that nevertheless the distribution of the supplies has been a function of the Commis-

sion no less real than the obtaining of the supplies to distribute—is also easily explained.

The explanation lies in the nature of the organisation for the interior distribution. The basis of this organisation is the existence in each of the nearly 3,000 communes of Belgium and 2,000 of occupied France, of a local committee headed by the burgomaster or *maire*. These committees control the communal warehouses and issue from them the food on ration both to those who can pay and to those who have been given ration cards paid for from the benevolent fund.

Over these communal committees are imposed regional committees—a region is a larger or smaller group of communes established for convenience—who have charge of regional warehouses from which the communal warehouses are supplied. Over these again are the provincial and district committees, one for each of the nine Belgian provinces—a special one for Brussels and its immediate environs, Greater Brussels—and one for each of the six districts into which the occupied French territory is arbitrarily divided for *ravitaillement* purposes. These committees have charge of the provincial and dis-

trict warehouses and mills which are the major centres of distribution. Finally, over these again are the Belgian National Committee (*Comité National Belge de Secours et d'Alimentation*) and the chief French Committee (*Comité d'Alimentation du Nord de la France*).

Associated with this series of communal, regional, provincial, district, and national committees are hundreds of special committees supervising various special lines of benevolent activity and more or less closely affiliated with the official series and controlled by it.

The American Commission is independent of all these, but has representatives on the national and provincial committees and many of the special committees, and hands over to these under proper control and continuous supervision the foodstuffs imported. Thus it is that the forty thousand Belgians and ten thousand French men and women provide that host of hands necessary for the detailed distribution of supplies. Under other circumstances the foodstuffs and clothing might well have been simply turned over to the Belgian and French relief organisation for it to do with them as

EDGAR RICKARD

Connected with the Commission from the beginning to the present. Honorary Secretary in London, October, 1914, to October, 1916; Assistant Director in New York, November, 1916, to May, 1917; Assistant Director in Washington, May, 1917, to present. Also now on the staff of the U. S. Food Administration.

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JOHN F. LUCEY

Connected with the Commission at the beginning; Director in Rotterdam, October to December, 1914; Director in Brussels, December, 1914, to February, 1915; Director in New York, May to August, 1916. Was later connected with the United States Food Administration.

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JOHN B. WHITE

Connected with the Commission from the beginning. Director in London, October, 1914, to September, 1915; Director in New York, December, 1915, to April, 1916. Now member of the War Trade Board as representative of the U. S. Food Administration.

it saw best. But the circumstances were not other; they were precisely such as rendered impossible this easy escape by the American Commission from the responsibility of seeing the food and clothing down to the very mouths and backs of the people for whom they were intended.

CHAPTER THREE

THE COMMISSION AND THE GOVERNMENTS

THE two chief guarantees given the Allied Governments by the Commission, by virtue of which the Commission had permission to import the great quantities of supplies into the occupied territories, were that none of the food and clothing so imported should get to the Germans, and that all of it would be equitably distributed to the people according to their needs. For the maintenance of these two conditions the Commission has always been held personally and immediately responsible by the Allied Governments. The Americans in Belgium were neutral and independent; the Belgians were captives in German hands, unable to give such guarantees.

The Commission had given the same guarantees also, by implication, to all of the millions of individuals in the United States, England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere who were constantly giving money and supplies for the relief of Belgium.

It was necessary, therefore, that the Americans in Belgium should have immediate oversight and all the control necessary of the detailed distribution, to be able to assure the Allied Governments and the world at large of the maintenance of the guarantees. And through all the two and a half years of the activities of the Americans in the occupied territories, this immediate oversight and control of, and personal participation in, the work of final distribution has been maintained. The hands of the forty thousand Belgian and ten thousand French committee men and women gave out the supplies under the keen eyes of the forty Americans.

The detailed methods of this distribution would form a long story in themselves which must be postponed for the moment, in order that a clearer understanding may be gained now of the extraordinary diplomatic conditions under which the Commission has carried on its work. The international relations and diplomatic standing of the Commission have been sources of amazement, of irritation, of admiration, of congratulation, in a word, of constant attention, in the chancelleries of Europe since the beginning of the war. That experienced diplomat, Baron

von der Lancken—who, in his capacity as Chief of the Political Department, acted as a sort of Secretary for Foreign Affairs for the late Governor-General von Bissing's German Government of Belgium—said to me once: "The Commission has accomplished a great thing in actually feeding the Belgians, but it has accomplished a greater thing in achieving the extraordinary international position it enjoys." That was, of course, the point of view of the diplomat. The point of view of the Commission is that its international position is simply incidental, though necessary, to its effectiveness in feeding the people. It has been an international bridge across which messengers and messages of mercy might pass between camps that were otherwise wholly isolated by bitterness and distrust.

What is this international position? How has it come about? Why is it necessary?

It is, of course, obvious that there could be no relief of Belgium without an agreement between the belligerent Powers; or, rather, an agreement between each side and the relief organisation, or the neutral ministers acting as its protecting patrons, granting certain privileges to the relief body. As the Allied

MILLARD HUNSIKER

Connected with the Commission at the beginning; first Director in London, October, 1914, to March, 1915



THE RIGHT HON. DAVID LLOYD-GEORGE

First as Chancellor of the Exchequer and later as Prime Minister, an active and powerful British supporter of the Commission

Governments controlled the oceans and maintained a blockage of the Belgian (now essentially German) coast, it was necessary to have *laissez-passers* for the relief ships and cargoes on the water and permission for the ships to land their cargoes in some port from which they could readily be transported into Belgium and Northern France. As the Germans also by means of their submarines and occasional short-lived raiders kept alive a certain danger to ocean traffic, a similar guarantee of lack of molestation of the relief ships was necessary from them.

On the other hand, no such privilege could be granted by the Allied Governments if it were not made certain that the foodstuffs thus imported from overseas and from England and France themselves would be rigorously restricted to the use of the civil population in the occupied territories. The guarantee of non-requisition of the imported supplies had to be obtained from the German Government and military authorities. More than that, as it would have been absurd for the Allied Governments to allow foods regularly to be sent into Belgium and Northern France merely to replace similar native foods as regularly taken out by the Germans, it was

necessary to obtain guarantees that the drain on the native resources of the occupied territories would not proceed further, at least, than that permitted support of the occupying army, regularly recognised by international rules of war. It will be seen later that the Relief Commission was able to obtain guarantees much better than this.

As the whole of the Commission's imports for Belgium and Northern France are landed at Rotterdam and taken in through Holland, it was necessary to get Dutch governmental recognition of the work. Much more was got. Holland gave valuable privileges in various ways, and has consistently rendered official support to the relief work from its beginning. It has permitted its Minister to Belgium (at Le Havre), Jongkeer de Weede, to act as one of the Commission's honorary chairmen, while its Chargé d'Affaires (now Minister Resident) in Brussels, Mynheer Vollenhoven, has been of constant practical assistance.

Spain, also, has given its official recognition to the Commission by permitting its Ambassador in London, Señor Don Merry del Val y Zulueta, and its Minister in Brussels, the Marqués de Villalobar, to

act as honorary chairmen, and both of these gentlemen have also been concerned from the beginning in the Commission's diplomatic negotiations. The Marqués de Villalobar has indeed played a continuously active and important part in Commission affairs.

From the Belgian Government, too, in its pathetic isolation on French soil and in the tiny corner of Belgium left to it, had to be obtained official recognition, financial aid, and the granting of what can only be called a monopoly of relief work in its occupied territory, in order that the Commission might have every advantage in the collection of relief funds and might exercise that rigorous control over native foods necessary to the maintenance of its guarantees to the Allied Governments.

Finally, as the American ambassadors to London, Berlin, and Paris, and the American ministers in Brussels and The Hague were honorary chairmen of the Commission; as the members of its American advisory committee [Messrs. Hemphill (also treasurer of the Commission), Bertron, Coffin, Cutting, Gary, Honnold, Lucey, Stimson, Straus, Trumbull, Vanderlip and White] were personally invited

by President Wilson, at Mr. Hoover's request, to serve on this Committee; as Ambassadors Page and Gerard and Ministers Whitlock and Van Dyke have busied themselves continuously with diplomatic negotiations on account of the Commission; and as President Wilson has taken a hand personally and most effectively in several critical periods in its history, the American Government has been closely associated officially with the Commission's activities.

The Commission, therefore, has had an official recognition, since its inception, from all the Governments, both belligerent and neutral, interested in its work. This recognition has been much more than merely formal and passive. In addition to the numerous and various guarantees given it by the belligerent Governments, there has been an active assistance rendered it financially in the way of large subventions by Belgium, England, and France; free use of harbours, canals, railroads, telegraphs, and telephones by Holland; and reduced freight rates and remitted canal tolls and customs duties in the occupied territories by Germany. Extraordinary concessions and aid in connection with the movement of the Commission members and the carriage and

reduced censorship of the Commission's mails have been made by the belligerents. Its members have crossed the channel in convoyed English despatch boats, passed through closed frontiers, scurried about in swift motors over all the occupied territory in which few other cars than German military ones ever moved, visited villages at the front under shell fire, lived at the very Great Headquarters of all the German armies of the West, been trusted on their honour to do a thousand and one things and be in a thousand and one places prohibited to all other civilians, and have lived up to the trust. They have suffered from the mistakes of uninformed or stupid soldiers, and spent nights in jail; they have taken chances under bombing airmen, and been falsely but dangerously accused as spies; but despite obstacles and delays and danger they have carried the little triangular red-lettered white C. R. B. flag to every town and hamlet in the imprisoned land, and have gulped and passed on wet-eyed as the people by the roads uncovered to the little flag, with all its significance of material and spiritual encouragement. Under this flag they have been protector and protected at once.

CHAPTER FOUR

NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON AND BERLIN

THE outcome of the many and various negotiations of the Commission with the various Governments has been determined by two chief considerations: humanitarianism and international politics. The Commission has had really but one consideration to guide it, the needs of the people of Belgium and Northern France, but the Governments have had always to keep in mind the relation which the Commission's activities might have to the international situation. And it must be confessed at once that these activities, whether the Commission wished it or not, and however technically correct its attitude of impartial neutrality may have been, have exercised a real and ponderable influence, not only on international politics, but even directly on the actual military situation.

The possible differing points of view and hence governmental attitudes which can be assumed regarding the Commission's work came out clearly

in the early history of the Commission in a series of interviews and exchanges of correspondence between representatives of the British Government and Mr. Hoover.

On January 21, 1915, Mr. Hoover had a meeting with Mr. Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord Emmott, representing the Committee on Trading with the Enemy; Lord Eustace Percy, representing the Foreign Office; and the Attorney General, Sir John Simon. The work of the Commission had already, for two months and a half, been going forward actively under certain agreements provisionally made with the British Government and certain specific guarantees officially given by the Germans. It had been, however, all this time an open question with the British Government whether the relief work was not a real military disadvantage for the Allies, and much pressure was being brought on the responsible government heads by the military authorities to cut off, or at least modify and curtail, the work of the Commission.

The primary occasion of the meeting was the discussion of the financial arrangements of the Commission, but the talk soon touched the fundamental

matter of the continuance of relief work at all. I quote directly from Mr. Hoover's memorandum of the discussion, made immediately after the meeting:

"Mr. Lloyd George stated that he felt that, indirect as the matter was, it was certainly assisting the enemy and that this assistance would take place in several ways. In the first instance, we were giving the Belgians more food resources with which to stand requisitions in food by the Germans; we were giving them more resources generally with which to stand monetary levies and that, beyond all this, in relieving the Germans from the necessity of feeding the civil population, we were directly prolonging the war, which was bound to be largely one of economic character, and that economic pressure was the principal method by which the Allies would ultimately win. He expressed the belief that the Germans would, in the last resort, provision the people of Belgium, and that our action was akin to provisioning the civil population of a besieged city, and thus prolonging the resistance of the garrison. He was, for these reasons, wholly opposed to our operations, benevolent and humane as they were, and therefore he could not see his way to grant our request.

"I pointed out, first, that as to the requisitioning of food, the Germans had given an undertaking that after the first of January no such requisitions would be made, and I read out to him the undertaking which had been given to the American Minister in Berlin, and informed him that we were satisfied, from the many agents which we had in Belgium, that the Germans were carrying this out with the utmost scrupulousness. I furthermore informed him that the Germans had impressed none of our actual food. Also I stated that I did not believe that the feeding of the civil population increased the resources which they had available for money levies. We were introducing no new money into Belgium, but were simply giving circulation to that already existing, and that there was no danger of the Germans taking the money which we collected for foodstuffs, because that was, in effect, in the possession of the American Minister.

"On the second point, as to whether the Germans would ultimately provision the civil population, I told him that I was satisfied that they would not do so; that when we undertook this labour we undertook it with the utmost reluctance, and our first

move was to satisfy ourselves that this population would starve unless America intervened and converted the hitherto-negative quality of neutrality into one of positive neutrality; that, as proof that the Germans would not provision the civil population, I thought it was desirable that he should understand the German views on this question, and I recited to him the confirmation by the German military of the current statement made in Germany that there was no clause in the Hague Convention obliging the Germans to provision the civil population of Belgium, but that, on the contrary, it incidentally provided that the civil population should support the military.

"I told him further, that the Germans contended that the Belgains were a people of great resources; that these resources would become valuable at once on a partial recovery of industry; that this recovery of industry could take place the instant that they were given a port through which they could trade with the neutral world; that in taking the port of Antwerp and opening it to neutral ships they had given the Belgian civil population a means of provisioning themselves, but that this outlet had been

blocked by the British Navy, and the British must therefore bear the responsibility. Further, that the Belgian population, by continuing its hostility and its passive resistance, was assisting the Allies by compelling the Germans to operate the public services, rendering trade useless to them, and requiring from them a considerable army of occupation, and that, as the Allies do all this, they must take the responsibility of these people starving. Furthermore, the Germans contend that, while they have ample food supplies to carry their own people through the struggle, they have not sufficient to carry on their backs the 10,000,000 people in Belgium and France inside their lines, and that, as they are struggling for national existence, they must feed their own people and attend to their military exigencies first.

"I pointed out that I did not offer these arguments as my own, but to illustrate the fixity of mind by which the German people justified their action in refusing to feed the Belgians, and asked him if he could conceive for one moment that, with this mental attitude of conviction on their part that they are right and the Allies wrong, they would be likely to feed the Belgians. I pointed out that starvation

had actually occurred in Belgium before we had begun work; that some, although perhaps little, riot had occurred, but sufficient to indicate the fixity of the Germans in their intentions. I further pointed out the position of the French people in the Meuse Valley, who had not had our assistance, and were already dying of starvation although under German occupation, and I expressed the conviction that the Germans would never feed the civil population.

"Mr. Lloyd George denounced the whole of this as a monstrous attitude, to which I replied that, be that as it might, one matter stood out in my mind, and that was that the English people had undertaken this war for the avowed purpose of protecting the existence of small nations, of vindicating the principle of guaranteed neutrality by which small nations might exist, for the avowed purpose of guaranteeing to the world the continuance of democracy as against autocracy in government, and that it would be an empty victory if one of the most democratic of the world's races should be extinguished in the process, and ultimate victory should be marked by an empty husk. I said that the English people were great enough to disregard the doubtful value

of military advantages in favour of assurances that these people should survive, and I felt the obligation went even further than mere acquiescence in our work, and extended to an opportunity to the English to add to their laurels by showing magnanimity toward these people, a magnanimity which would outlast all the bitterness of this war.

"Mr. Lloyd George then stated to his colleagues abruptly: 'I am convinced. You have my permission. I would be obliged if you gentlemen would settle the details of the machinery necessary to carry it out.' Then, turning to me, he said that I would forgive him for running away, but that he felt the world would yet be indebted to the American people for the most magnanimous action which neutrality had yet given rise to."

Ever since that momentous interview, with its dramatic and gratifying finish, the British Government—and with it the French Government—has stood steadfastly by the Commission and its work. This interest ultimately led to the granting of a subvention of $5,000,000 a month from the British and French Governments, passed to the Commission through the Belgian Government.

Also, on the whole, the people of England and the whole British Empire, the people, that is, as distinguished from the official Government, have supported the Commission. For this British support Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Edward (now Lord) Grey, Sir Robert Cecil, and Lord Eustace Percy, of the Foreign Office, are largely responsible, together with a great benevolent organisation called the "National Committee for Relief in Belgium," organised in April, 1915, with the Lord Mayor of London as its chairman, and two active managers in the persons of Mr. A. Shirley Benn, M.P., as treasurer, and Mr. W. A. M. Goode, as secretary. This committee has conducted an impressive campaign of propaganda and solicitation of funds, collecting $12,500,000 with which to purchase foodstuffs and clothing for the Belgian destitute.

But there has always been, and there exists to-day in England, a certain body of antagonists to the relief work. They represent the extreme militaristic view. The reason for the antagonism comes entirely from a convinced belief on the part of those holding this attitude that the relief works to the military advantage of the Germans by relieving them of the neces-

sity of feeding the imprisoned people, and enables them, by hook or crook, to get some of the imported food, and to take openly a considerable part of the native Belgian crops. And this despite the fact that the Commission has asserted and proved over and over again that the Germans get but an almost inappreciable fraction of the imported food, and this not through seizure but mostly through Belgian *fraudeurs*, and have given guarantees—not wholly lived up to, but maintained in such measure as can be accepted as tolerable—to refrain from the removal from Belgium, or the wholesale use by the army, of all native food products.

But if there is a party in England that has opposed the relief work, so also is there one in Germany. And it has been, as in England, the Foreign Office, together with the authorities of the German General Government in Belgium, that has saved the work from extinction. Also, as in England, the arguments of this party—similarly, the extreme militaristic one—opposed to the relief have been that it worked a military disadvantage to Germany. Their demand has been that rather than let a single German man, woman, or child be hungry, absolutely all the native

foodstuffs of the occupied territories should be seized for German consumption, and the Belgians and French allowed to starve—if the Allied Governments would not break their blockade. Germany was to advantage both by the use of the Belgian food and by using the imprisoned people as hostages to be starved to force the opening of the Allied blockade of Germany. Reventlow and his jingo supporters have constantly cried out: "Abolish Belgian relief, and kick the Americans out."

The Commission has had to fight constantly against being kicked out. One of the incidents of this struggle for existence may be related by way of illustration. In the summer of 1916 the Commission began a hard fight for two imperatively needed concessions from the German authorities. In the first place, the ever-increasing difficulties of getting ships for the growing needs, in food quantities, of the people imprisoned in a land becoming more and more exhausted of native foods, made it necessary for the Commission to effect an arrangement with the German military command whereby a larger proportion of the 1916 native crop of Northern France would be turned over to the civil population

Photo by Paul Thompson

VISCOUNT GREY, K. G. OF FALLODEN

Formerly British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. An active supporter of the Commission

SIR WILLIAM GOODE, K. B. E.

Organizer and Managing Secretary of the British National Committee for Belgian Relief, which collected more than twelve million dollars for the benevolent funds of the Commission; now connected with the English Ministry of Food.

than had been the case with the 1915 crop. In the second place, the dearth of protein- and fat-containing food was beginning to affect seriously the vitality of the population of Northern France, the 600,000 children of the region especially showing the effects of this lack of meat, milk, and eggs, the native supplies of these foods being mostly seized by the German army, or already exhausted.

Through the English Government, we had discovered that Holland would let us purchase considerable quantities of fresh meat, eggs, butter, and cheese, if we could arrange to get permission from the Germans for their importation by us from Holland through Belgium into France. Germany—which has always looked on Holland as a storehouse of food which by some turn of the screw could be forced, despite England's preventive measures, into her own larders—could prevent this export by the simple expedient of closing the Dutch-Belgian frontier to these foods. As a matter of fact the Commission has always had to have the agreement of the Germans for the import across this frontier of every ounce of food or other supplies taken into the occupied territories.

The negotiations for these two concessions had already been pursuing a slow and most unsatisfactory course, the Berlin Government and General Staff blocking us at every step, undoubtedly because of the pressure from the extreme militaristic and anti-relief party. This party was making strong use of the discomfort of the German people brought about by their food shortage, and was encouraging the people to demand that no food, that might by any circumstance be possibly available to them, should be allowed to go to the people of Belgium and Northern France. However, the Commission's demands for the two concessions had some measure of support from certain officers of the Great Headquarters at Charleville and from General von Bissing's Government at Brussels. It was arranged, therefore, that Mr. Hoover (who had been negotiating in London with the Allied Governments in connection with their demand that the Germans should give up the whole of the native crop of Northern France to the civil population) and I (who had been negotiating with the General Staff at the Great Headquarters and Governor von Bissing's Government at Brussels) should go to Berlin and take up

the matters directly with the German Government and highest military command.

We first, however, met at The Hague to discuss matters with the Dutch Government and with the British Minister to Holland, Sir Alan Johnstone. Here we became acquainted with the details of the agreement between England and Holland affecting Dutch food exports, and with the condition of the corresponding agreement between Germany and Holland. The important thing in these agreements affecting our attempt to get Dutch foods into France was a clause (introduced as a result of Mr. Hoover's negotiations in London) recognising the principle that, if the Commission could arrange to get permission from the Germans for these imports, the quantities so imported should be in diminution of England's share of the exports. It was a generous concession, and gave us a strong position. Information of the existence of this clause had already been given the Germans at Great Headquarters and Brussels, but they had demanded ocular proof of the agreement. Sir Alan therefore gave us a certified copy of the clause to use in our further negotiations with the Germans. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Mynheer Loudon, a man of great ability, broad-mindedness, and generous sympathies, who has always given a cordial support to the Commission's work, informed us that he was himself making representations to Berlin in favour of meeting our requests.

On August 3rd Mr. Hoover and I started for Berlin. On the same train we found Baron von der Lancken, chief of the political department of General von Bissing's Government, and Dr. Rieth, of his staff, both of whom had shown themselves friendly to the Dutch imports matter. From them we learned that there was to be a great conference in Berlin, and that three important Great Headquarters' officers, two of whom we knew to be friendly to our requests in the matter of the French native crop, were also on their way to Berlin. We felt, therefore, less alone in our struggle to help save the lives of 600,000 children of Northern France. These men would aid us!

Making the trip to the German capital without uncomfortable incident, thanks to our special military passes, we arrived at nine o'clock the next morning, and, by chance, met at once, in the lobby

of the Hotel Esplanade, one of the Great Headquarters' officers, Hauptmann Graf W——, through whom all Commission affairs were always first taken up when we had dealings with the General Staff. He greeted us with some haste and said that he had to rush off at once to an important conference on our affairs. He was wholly uncommunicative about the scope and character of the meeting, but informed us that General X——, Acting Quartermaster General of the German army, wished us to take tea with him at the hotel at four o'clock. We understood that this was to be an important tea-drinking!

In our need for support we went to see Ambassador Gerard. He had never failed in his energetic support whenever the Commission needed help at the Berlin Court. He gave us advice which, at the moment, was disheartening, but turned out to be wise counsel. It was that we should steer clear of invoking official governmental assistance in this affair, but should make the fight simply on the basis of the Commission's standing and influence, and keep international politics out of it as far as possible. The Germans knew that all we were struggling for was the good of the imprisoned people of Belgium

and France, and that we were playing the game honestly. He believed that the Commission could fight this fight best alone. His words were at least an encouraging assurance to us of the Commission's extraordinary international position.

Promptly at four we found the three officers from the Great Headquarters, the third being Major von K——, a man of great capacity, under whose immediate supervision rested all affairs connected with the feeding of the civil population in the occupied territory. He had always handled Commission matters with intelligence and prompt decision, and usually with sympathetic understanding. We had known Count W—— and Major von K—— ever since the beginning of the work, but it was our first meeting with General X——, whose office was one of high importance, only second in importance, indeed, in the German army, to the Chief of Staff of the Field Armies, a position at that time filled by General von Falkenhayn. General X—— is an enormous, burly man and makes an impression of brutal strength. He drank whiskey instead of tea.

As we sat down, Major von K——, with characteristic promptness and in a few words, gave us

news of the great conference. It was startling news and most of it bad. The conference was one of important representatives of the General Staff, the General Government of Belgium, the Foreign Office, the Department of the Interior, and of all other departments immediately interested in the handling of the civil populations in all occupied territories. It had apparently already definitely decided that we could import no Dutch foodstuffs, and that no further allocation of the French native crop could be made to the civil population. But these were only incidents in a larger question taken up by it, which was that of the Commission's being allowed to continue its work at all! Just as the famous meeting with Mr. Lloyd George on January 21, 1915—arranged primarily for a discussion of certain phases of the Commission's activities—revealed the strength of the feeling in England against the relief work as a whole, so this Berlin visit of ours, to take up simply two special points in our work, revealed itself as coincident with a crisis in the Commission's history, determined by the crystallisation of the German opposition to the work.

Major von K—— said that things looked very bad

for us. Extremely violent speeches had been made against the work, and only two or three men had ventured to speak in favour of it. These were, however, men of influence, and represented important parts of the Government, notably the Foreign Office and Interior. But the Reventlow jingoes were in the saddle. A special cause of bitterness was a public despatch from the British Foreign Minister which had just been published in all the German papers, demanding that the German authorities turn over to the civil populations in the French, Polish, and Serbian occupied territories (as had already been done in Belgium) the entirety of the native products of these territories. The bellicose speakers in the conference demanded that the German Government answer this despatch at once with a curt refusal and a statement that, as the British blockade was responsible for the food deprivations of the Belgians and French, the *ravitaillement* should be abolished, the people allowed to starve, and the Allied governments be held responsible for their starvation. These men declared that Germany could not for one moment accept the position that England should dictate its attitude and action toward the occupied territories, and that the

only position Germany could take henceforth was to throw the population on the shoulders of England, which could open its blockade or let the Belgians and French starve, just as it was trying to let the Germans starve.

The feeling all over Germany was high, and the conference seemed likely to end the Commission's work then and there. Just one ray of light came to us in this dark hour. During our depressing conversation with the Headquarters officers, a remark was made by one of them to the effect that if the request for a larger allocation of the native products to the civil population had come simply from the Commission, something might have been done, but with England demanding it—"No, a thousand times No."

This was our cue. We repudiated England! What England demanded was its affair. Let the Germans fight it out with England. What the Commission pleaded for was its own affair—the affair of saving the lives of human beings; of keeping body and soul together for ten million people, known to the world as Belgians and French, but known to the Commission as human beings, men, women, and children, especially children, crying for food!

As we were not allowed to attend the conference we had to work outside. We argued with the Great Headquarters men. We urged on the representatives of General von Bissing's Belgian Government the consequence to the population for whose lives this Government was responsible, and on the representatives of the Foreign Office and Department of the Interior the consequences of the position of Germany before the world if German action should cause the terrible tragedy which the abolishment of the *ravitaillement* would certainly entail. We argued here and pleaded there. And it all had to be done before that fateful conference of the day's length should dissolve.

The long story must be cut short. We succeeded! The Commission was allowed to continue its work. And even more. Just three weeks later we signed an agreement with the General Staff by which *twice* the proportion of the coming crops of Northern France was reserved for the people as had been reserved of the previous crop. And still later—unfortunately much later, but still better than not at all —a little fresh meat and butter and cheese from Holland began to be eaten by the protein- and fat-hungry people of Northern France.

The conference broke up with the Reventlow gang sullen and angry, but accepting, as all Germans do accept, the will of the higher command. Mr. Hoover returned to England to continue negotiations with London. I went back to Brussels and the Great Headquarters to hasten the formulation and signature of the agreements. The crisis was past.

The story of one of the numerous Commission crises has been sketched. But one incident of that Berlin visit—wholly irrelevant to the matter of our errand—may yet be told.

As we sat, after long and strenuous debating, tired and silent for a moment, over our tea and saccharine—the burly General over his *n*th whiskey and seltzer—the hush was broken by a hoarse whispering between the General and Count W——. The Count seemed to remonstrate, the General to insist, and then W——, addressing us, said that the General wished to tell us the story of Nurse Cavell!

We were startled and uneasy. That was the kind of thing Commission men and Germans did not talk about. If we were to carry on effectively and *neutrally* we tried to forget—for the moment—the

Nurse Cavell and the many other less-notorious but hardly-less-sickening similar incidents of the German pacification of Belgium.

But General X—— insisted. We knew his relations to the murder of Miss Cavell. He was the man directly responsible for it. He was Military Governor of Brussels at the time. He, not von Bissing, must bear forever the chief burden of that horror—and stupidity. And it was this burden that made him want to tell the story. Also, he had just seen at a Berlin hospital his only son struggling for life, which, if he won, was to be the life of a man with both eyes shot out, and a face hardly recognisable. And the sight of his son—and the memory of Miss Cavell—had made him remark that this was a horrible war!

And so he wanted to tell the story of "The Cavell" (it was always *Die Cavell* in his mouth). He said the Belgians called him a murderer, another Duke of Alva, but he wasn't. He was just a soldier doing his duty. *Die Cavell* was a thing that interfered with the German control of Belgium. It had to be got rid of. "So I had her shot. Yes, I did it." Did we think the world called him a murderer, too?

His son had no eyes. It was hard. It was a horrible war. "*Die Cavell, die Cavell,* ah, *die Cavell!*" . . . It was not a pretty story. But it is a story that he will tell often before he dies. That is part of his punishment.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE GERMAN AND ALLIED GUARANTEES

THE actual official agreements and guarantees which made possible the work of the Commission in Belgium and Northern France are many and various. They make hundreds of pages in the *dossiers* of the Commission, and cover subjects all the way from an agreement by the Germans to our control of the whole native crops of bread-grains in Belgium to a permission by the British for the importation of a few cakes of soap for our own men. Soap is a more significant article in war time in a blockaded country than one may realise at first. The word "glycerine" gives the clue to this significance.

It is, of course, quite impossible to refer here to all or even to many of these guarantees and agreements. But a few are of such outstanding importance for any clear conception of the work of the Commission that they must be told of with exactness and in some little detail. For example, the

various agreements concerning the control of native food crops (as well as of the imported supplies) entered into by the German General Government; General von Bissing's half civil, half military, government of most of Belgium; and the German General Staff, which governs directly all of occupied France and part of Belgium, gave the Commission an unusual responsibility, and forced it to undertake, with much Belgian help, a very difficult and arduous kind of labour commonly referred to by us as "inspection and control." This work led us into more difficulties with the German authorities, and even with certain groups of Belgians, than all our other work together.

The first agreement given by the German authorities in immediate control of Belgium granted permission for the import of food by way of the Dutch frontier and guaranteed that all such imported foodstuffs would be entirely free from requisition by the German army. This guarantee was given early in September, 1914, by Baron von der Goltz, then Governor-General of Belgium, to Messrs. Heineman and Hulse, neutral members of the original Brussels Comité Central. The guarantee was repeated in

however, before the end of November. On November 21st the authorities of the German Government of Belgium notified Ministers Whitlock and Villalobar—these two gentlemen thus formally assuming their position as protecting ministers of the American Commission and Belgian Comité National—of their agreement to the stipulation asked for, and two days later the German Foreign Office in Berlin confirmed these guarantees to Ambassador Gerard—"until further notice and with reservation of any recall which may become necessary at any time."

In the meantime the formal agreement of the British Admiralty to the free passage of the Commission's ships had been obtained, and it only remained to settle details with both Governments as to special papers and passes to be carried by the captains, indicating that the cargoes were exclusively the Commission's supplies, and were to be allowed the "freedom of the seas." Arrangements also were made for special distinctive markings to be displayed on the ships, and against any possible misuse of these safeguarding markings.

All this took time, but the purchase and importation went ahead anyway. It had to go ahead if the

Belgians were not to starve, and by some means or other the Commission has always managed to do what had to be done. We became so accustomed to trouble and delay, to accident or wilful interference, and to meeting the situation quickly by expedient or by the "big stick," that unless we had a major crisis once a month and a minor crisis once a week, we became nervous through inactivity and soft peace! As a matter of fact, we have suffered little from this cause during the course of our work; the crises always came on to save us.

The British insistence that we could not continue to take food into Belgium unless the Germans agreed not alone to refrain from requisition of such imported foodstuffs, but to refrain from taking for their army any of the native foodstuffs, made it necessary for us to use all effort to get such a guarantee and to get it quickly. Ambassador Gerard took up this matter energetically at Berlin, and by the end of December he was able to report to Washington and to the Commission that he had been assured by Under Secretary of State Zimmerman (later head of the Foreign Office and now replaced by von Kuehlman) that the commanding general in Belgium would

give assurance to the protecting ministers of the Commission in Brussels that the German military authorities would make no further requisition of any food supplies in Belgium as long as the Commission continued to send in food. Secretary Zimmerman's formal letter to Mr. Gerard added to this assurance the statement that the Governor General of Belgium would authorise the American and Spanish ministers at Brussels to convince themselves in any way which should appear to them advisable that the prohibition was observed most scrupulously. Unfortunately, the assurance in Secretary Zimmerman's formal note of the non-requisition of native foods and forage differed a little in wording, but importantly in effect, from that conveyed by him verbally to Mr. Gerard in that it was limited to those commodities which, if taken, "would require to be replaced by importation by the American Committee for Belgian Relief." And Governor von Bissing, in his decree of a short time later promulgating the order of non-requisition, specifically noted as alone being covered by the decree: wheat, flour, rice, dried peas and beans, corn, sugar, oil cakes, and other prepared forage for cattle.

These were the only foodstuffs then being taken into Belgium by us.

Although this was a large concession from the point of view of the German Government (which has steadfastly maintained the position that it had full right, under international practice in time of war, to maintain its army of occupation on the products of the occupied territory), it was unfortunately a concession less sweeping than that insisted on by the British Government, and in addition the guarantee itself was for some time not very strictly lived up to by the German military authorities in Belgium. This involved the Commission in a long struggle with both the German and the British Governments to effect such compromise arrangements as would not put it out of business.

Two incidents illustrate the difficulties the Commission has always had in making the purely philanthropic character of its undertaking realised. Mr. Hoover had come to Brussels, in February, 1915, to lend his personal endeavours on the ground to the struggle to get from the German authorities there the more sweeping guarantees needed, and to "plane out" some other lesser difficulties in our relations

with our German friends, such matters as that of a freer circulation in the country by our representatives, etc. Our young men were too often arrested and delayed—indeed, often temporarily jailed—by stupid or uninformed guards for the most successful prosecution of their work. Another of these lesser difficulties came from the interesting objection made by the Governor-General to the fact that we were giving the Belgians a better bread, and at a lower cost to those who could pay, than the civil population in Germany was getting!

In an interview Mr. Hoover had with one of the most important officers of von Bissing's staff, this official broke off the general discussion to say abruptly:

"Now, we are all just human here, and I want to ask you, as man to man, one question: What do you Americans get out of this business? Why are you doing it?"

"I tried to explain first with evenness of temper and then more emphatically," writes Mr. Hoover in his memorandum of the conversation, "that the whole thing was simply a humane effort; and that

not only did none of us get anything out of it, but that most of us lost something by it. But I found it too difficult to be emphatic enough about this to make any real impression on him."

A few months later I had a similar experience at the Great Headquarters of the German Armies in occupied France. At a dinner-conference with certain officials of the General Staff, who concerned themselves especially with our work, the first remark made to me by the most important officer, General von S., who came in late and sat at the head of the table, was: "Well, how is business?" I could only reply that it was going on about as well as any business could that made no profits for anybody concerned with its management.

But it should be added that this earlier almost-universal belief among the Germans—and many Belgians!—that there must be "something in it for the Americans," gradually came to be dispelled. At least the more intelligent and broader-minded men at Berlin, and also in General von Bissing's Government, and at the Great Headquarters, came to recognise that the Americans of the Commission had to be admitted to be curious exceptions to the conven-

tional German conception of American nature; our interest in dollars was not self-interest. Part of the new conviction was due to personal acquaintanceship with our men and methods, and part to the very careful and detailed examination which was constantly made by them of all our statistical tables. They discovered, among other things, in this close watch of the work, that despite the swiftly rising prices paid elsewhere in the world for foodstuffs, the prices required by the Commission of those Belgians who could pay for their food did not keep pace with this rise, but, thanks to the ever-perfecting business organisation of the work, and the world-wide voluntary assistance of buyers and transportation agents, remained nearly stationary. And they learned, too, that what "profits" were realised by requiring the paying Belgians to pay a little more than cost were immediately turned over to the benevolent or purely charitable side of the work: that, in other words, what profits were made all went to the destitute Belgians and not to the Commission.

But back to the guarantees. Despite all the pressure Ambassador Gerard and Minister Whitlock and the Commission could bring to bear on the German

authorities at Berlin and Brussels through the spring of 1915, these authorities held strictly to the form of the official note of Secretary Zimmerman and the decrees of Governor-General von Bissing regarding the kind of native food products they would not requisition, and only by the tolerance of the British Foreign Office was the Commission's work allowed to go on. But the Foreign Office never really receded from its position; in fact, it was deciding that the Commission would have to obtain an even more sweeping concession from the Germans.

In April the Commission was formally notified that the British Government would put up no longer with any compromise on the native foods question, but that the Commission must immediately obtain from the Germans not only an agreement to renounce any further requisitioning of the native foodstuffs in stock, but also a guarantee that the whole of the forthcoming Belgian harvest of the year would be reserved exclusively for the use of the civil population, and this under such conditions as would enable the Commission to assure the British Government of the strict carrying out of the guarantee. In the

light of the crying needs of the people and the limited amounts of food that could be imported by the Commission because of the difficulty of chartering enough ships, and in the light of the facts that the Allied Governments were paying for a large part of the foodstuffs imported, and the Germans were contributing almost nothing as yet, in money or foods, for the support of the people under their control, this requirement of the Allied Governments was not an unreasonable one. And the Commission, accepting it as such, put its whole energy into the task of trying to get from the German authorities an acceptance of the position.

Mr. Hoover set the machinery in motion to bring about the needed arrangement by a long letter to Ambassador Gerard, who began negotiations in Berlin with characteristic promptness and vigour. The matter was also taken up actively with Governor-General von Bissing's Government in Brussels, by Minister Whitlock, with the collaboration of the Spanish Minister, Marqués de Villalobar, and the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires, Vollenhoven. Through May and June the discussion and diplomatic struggle went on.

By this time Germany was feeling the effects of the Allied blockade in the real food shortage caused by it, and was probably in no position to feed ten million people in addition to her own, even if she had been willing to. Also, the shooting down of starving mobs in city streets by machine guns is no indication of a successful civil administration of a land, and Governor-General von Bissing's Government of Belgium was organised in the form of a quasi-civil administration—with, to be sure, a strong military odour. Peace and quiet are indications of successful civil administration, but people do not starve peacefully and quietly, and a starving population of seven and a half millions would, even without guns or bombs, be a serious group to handle. Therefore, if for no other reason than that of expediency—and it will be only fair to presuppose more humane reasons also—the German Government of Belgium has shown itself consistently favourable in principle, even if often very troublesome in specific matters, to the Commission's work.

By June, therefore, a favourable outcome of the negotiations was assured, and on June 25th Minister Whitlock was able to send to Mr. Hoover a mem-

orandum from Governor-General von Bissing, reciting his willingness to hold at the disposal of the Belgian civil population of the territory placed under his orders (most of Belgian East and West Flanders has always been under the immediate control of the General Staff) the product of the grain harvest of 1915 used for the making of bread (wheat and rye). But this concession was to be contingent upon a formal agreement by the Commission to continue to import into Belgium until harvest time of 1916 the remaining necessary commodities for the feeding of the people in the occupied territory.

To this the Allied Governments agreed, and on July 4th Governor von Bissing confirmed his earlier memorandum by a formal guarantee given to the protecting ministers, and the issuance of a decree, followed a little later by a supplementary one, declaring that "all cereals used for the making of bread, and other agricultural products mentioned in Article I arising from this year's harvest, will be exclusively reserved for the provisioning of the population." Article I enumerated wheat, barley, and oats used for bread-making—and also barley and straw intended for the consumption of cattle.

CHAPTER SIX

DO THE GERMANS GET THE FOOD?

THE essential result of the Governor-General's guarantee, and of all the multifarious details passed on by the Crop Commission, and correspondingly many and multifarious regulations announced by it, was to place month by month in the hands of the Commission and the Comité National the whole of the grain crop as far as it could be got from the farmers. Each farmer was allowed to retain what part of his product was necessary for the bread of his family through the year—he was, correspondingly, *not* allowed to get bread on the regular ration cards—and for seed for the next planting. The rest he was obliged to sell to the relief organisation—but at a fixed good price. This good price insured getting most of the grain out, and stimulated production for the following year. As a matter of fact, the farmers of Belgium have, next to the very rich, suffered less than any other class of the people.

Unfortunately they and their families compose hardly more than a sixth of the total population.

For the crop of 1916, the guarantee and general arrangements of 1915 were renewed, with some modifications even more favourable to the civil population. The new, or renewed, agreements for the crop of 1917 have been looked after by the Dutch and Spanish neutrals who have taken our places inside Belgium.

So much, then, for the Belgium native crop guarantees. The arrangements, very different in nature, as to the crops in Northern France, may be left to a later article describing the special conditions of our work in that region. A fleeting reference to these arrangements was made in the last article in connection with the recounting of an incident illustrating the international relations of the Commission.

Of the many, many other formal agreements between the Commission, or its protecting ministers, and the German authorities, space can be given here for reference to but one set intimately connected with the crop guarantees; indeed, including them. They are those later ones, more detailed and specific in statement and rather wider in scope than the

earlier ones, which recapitulate the whole of the basic German guarantees, on the existence of which and on the assurance by the Commission and its protecting ministers of the strict living up to which by the Germans, the Commission was allowed by the Allied Governments to continue its work. The first of these was given in July, 1915, the second in February, 1916, and a third in April, 1916.

The essential points in these German guarantees respecting the food of Belgium under which the Commission has carried on its work, and only by virtue of which the Allied Governments have permitted its continuance, are:

1. An agreement to take none of the imported food, and to permit all the measures deemed necessary by the Commission for the complete control and equitable distribution of this food;

2. An agreement to export to Germany none of the Belgium native food, except certain excess quantities of a few kinds of watery vegetables and fruits, not including such staples as potatoes, etc., and not to seize or purchase any of this native food for the maintenance of the occupying German army, except occasional small personal purchases by

individual soldiers not representing the army's commissary department;

3. To reserve, under combined German, Belgian, and Commission control, the entire native grain crops, fodder and live-stock (except horses), exclusively for the use of the civil population; and

4. To permit the Commission and its protecting ministers to assure themselves by suitable measures that these guarantees were lived up to.

The universal query is, Do the Germans get any of the Commission's food? The proper query, however, is a much more comprehensive one. It is: Do the Germans live up to all the food guarantees they have given? Do they not merely abstain from taking by force, or getting by devious means, any of the food imported by the Commission, but do they also really leave in the hands of the Belgians all their native crops and live-stock, and refrain both from exporting any of this food to Germany, and from feeding their army of occupation on it? And, finally, do they allow the Commission and its protecting ministers such freedom of movement and observation

in the country, and such control checks on the food, both imported and native, that they can *know* whether these guarantees are respected?

These are queries that the Commission has had to answer, from the beginning, constantly and honestly to itself and to the ever-watchful and inquiring British Foreign Office. There seems to have existed, ever since the fateful autumn days of 1914, a general suspicion of all German scraps of paper on which guarantees have been written. The Commission has always had to reckon with the possibility of "military exigency" overriding at any moment the guarantees under which its labours were permitted. And because of this it has had to establish within itself, or, better put, perhaps, to make of all that part of itself within Belgium an elaborate department of "inspection and control," with the effective help of all the great Belgian internal relief organisation with its forty thousand official members, and the eagerly proffered services of nearly all the seven and a half million other unofficial Belgians. I say "nearly all," because no population of seven millions but has its hundreds or thousands of bad little people ready to turn an honest penny by dishonest means.

For example, bakers. I am sure that not all bakers are dishonest, not even all Belgian bakers. But we certainly did have trouble with the bakers. Finally we set up bakers' courts: the American provincial representative and a member of the Belgian provincial committee for judges, and a lawyer assigned for the suspected baker; the judges were the prosecutors! Of course, we had no legal standing, no authority, indeed, except the trivial one of holding all the flour in our hands, and if we did not give the baker flour to bake, that ended *Monsieur le Boulanger*. So we either warned him, if he was trivially guilty and it was a first offence; or suspended him from baking for a week or two if he was more seriously guilty or a second-time offender; or put him entirely out of business if he was dishonest on a large scale or a proved incorrigible. Their pleas of extenuating circumstances were varied and ingenious. For example, how could a man of heart resist the pitiful appeals of a haggard, hungry woman for an extra kilo of bread for her children above the permitted allowance; or a woman less haggard, who would give the baker a warm kiss for an extra cold loaf?

Then there were the sellers of rice. We taught the Belgians the use of rice as a *piéce de résistance* in a war-time meal. They had known it before as a dessert. But not all of them liked rice, and by hoarding up their daily allowance for a week or two, they could—if they were dishonest—sell a kilo or so of rice at a fancy price to a German soldier. With this money they could buy a potato or two. Why not? We were cruel to report them to a Belgium civil court which could try them and punish them for infraction of the new law against the re-sale of the Commission's food. But remember the German soldier; many soldiers make an army. And remember the British Foreign Office.

But these were our little troubles. There were greater ones out near the Belgian-German frontier, along the fringes of Limburg, Liége, and Luxemburg provinces, where one only had to hand things over or through the electrified wire fence, or drive a pig through an opening in it guarded by a German sentry suffering from intermittent blindness. We had heard interesting reports of the doings at Welkenraedt, a Belgian frontier village, separated from an adjoining German town by a common road down

the middle of which ran the famous wire fence. One of our inspectors went to Welkenraedt. It was quiet and sleepy by day. But it was *so* wide-awake during the night. From eleven P.M. to three A.M. it was like a country fair, many Belgians coming to the wire with little bundles or a pig on a string; and on the other side many Germans, without bundles or pigs, but with the money to exchange for them. We got it stopped; but other villages took it up. It was a continuous struggle, and a continuous worry, despite the fact that all the exchanges for as long as they could run were trivial in total.

But the Belgian *fraudeurs* were not many, and they were dangerous only when they attempted things on the grand scale, not with German soldiers, but with German cattle- and pig- and sheep-buyers from Aix-la-Chapelle or Cologne. And here our appeal was direct to the German Governor-General; the man who had given the guarantees against export. And our appeals and demands were not in vain. He always tried, and mostly succeeded, to check anything like wholesale infractions. But it necessitated struggling. Ministers Whitlock and Villalobar, Chargé Vollenhoven, the Commission's director and

assistant-director in Brussels, and all its men in the provinces, had to keep everlastingly at it. And so did the Governor-General and his staff in the *Civil-Verwaltung* and the *Politische Abteilung*, because the cry for food was strong from inside Germany, and the threat of "military exigency" always imminent from the German army heads.

One of the means adopted by General von Bissing's Government to protect the foodstuffs was the issuance of placards to be exposed on warehouses, railroad wagons, carts, etc., safeguarding the supplies in storage or in course of transportation. On the following page is a copy (translated) of the placard used on our warehouses.

But if we can truthfully say that the German Government of Belgium could resist this pressure on the border with sufficient strength to limit the food leakage to such a minimum that the Commission and the Allied Governments, who were told of it all, could accept it as tolerable, it goes without saying that the guarantees preventing the internal seizure were maintained with even better strictness. And this is true. The German Government in Bel-

COMITÉ NATIONAL DE SECOURS ET D'ALIMENTATION

COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM

Service of storage of foodstuffs, provisions, and divers merchandise

By order of His Excellency, the Governor General in Belgium, all stocks stored in this warehouse, belonging to the Comité National de Secours et d'Alimentation, or to the Commission for Relief in Belgium, and intended for the civil population of Belgium shall be neither seized nor requisitioned by German military or civil authorities.

Brussels.....

gium lived up to its guarantees respecting the Commission's imported food in such measure that we may honestly say that the Germans got practically none of this food. And it has lived up to its guarantees respecting the native food stocks and crops in such measure that we may say the Germans have

got of this food only a very small fraction. It is a fraction that was increasing toward the end of our stay in Belgium. What it is now, our successors, the Dutch and Spanish neutrals who have taken our places in Belgium, must tell.

We can say this by virtue of the real knowledge we have had through our department of inspection and control; and by virtue of the strenuous and continuous efforts this department has made to help make the statements possible. It is too bad that space prevents even the barest account of the organisation and work of the department. It has engrossed the time and energy of some of our keenest eyes, best brains, and hardest fighters. Men like Joseph Coy Green, of Princeton, have given it almost their whole stock of strength and health.

The exceptions to the general decree of non-purchase by the Germans provided for by the phrases, "excess fresh vegetables" and "individual purchases by soldiers," have been sources of some leakage; these phrases have been hidden behind too often when we have run down serious infractions of the general guarantees. But on the whole, and to that large degree which has been necessary

to allow us to continue the work of relief of Belgium with clear consciences, and to allow the Allied Governments to permit and actually to support the work, the answer to the query: "But don't the Germans get the food?" is a categorical and positive "No."

If this answer and the consequent continued importation of food into Belgium can be accepted, as it has been, by both the British and French Governments, testing it always by their own very efficient secret intelligence service—certainly as keenly alive as any American dry-goods box strategists to every phase of possible military disadvantage that the relief of Belgium might entail for them—it is my opinion that the American public can overlook with equanimity the monotonous mutterings of these home-grown strategists of Podunk when Belgian relief is mentioned: "You can't tell *me* that the Germans ain't getting that food."

CHAPTER SEVEN

WHERE THE MONEY CAME FROM

BEFORE the food could be imported into Belgium and protected and distributed, it had to be found, bought, and transported from points all over the world; and before it could be bought and transported, money had to be found with which to buy and ship it. I shall attempt here to give a glimpse—it can hardly be more than that—of the extent of this task and how the Commission accomplished it; a task which has so far involved the purchase of more than three hundred million dollars' worth of food, and the transportation and handling of the more than three million tons of foodstuffs that were bought with this great sum.

The public appeals made in October, 1914, by Mr. Hoover, on behalf of the newly-organised American Commission for Relief in Belgium, and by Minister Whitlock through the President, resulted in the swift organisation of relief committees all over America.

But food had to be bought immediately, and so at the same time Mr. Hoover begged the British Government for a subvention that would enable the Commission to begin work at once on a sound financial basis. The sum of £100,000 [approximately $500,000] was granted, and, with this actual money in hand and excellent prospects for a large inflow from the charity of the world, the Commission was able to begin making purchases and contracts on the large scale necessary to meet the Belgian cry.

Thus, from the very beginning, the Commission has relied on Government subventions as well as world charity for the funds necessary to carry on its two-phased work, viz., work of general provisioning (*ravitaillement*), and work of pure benevolence (*secours*).

Up to June 1, 1917, when the Government subsidies were provided for by loans from the United States Government, the Commission had had from the British Government, in round numbers, $89,500,000, and from the French Government $66,000,000, both these sums being in the form of loans to the Belgian Government, for relief work in Belgium. In addition, the Commission had had, from France, $108,000,000 for relief expenditure in German-occu-

pied Northern France. As charity from private sources, the Commission had had, up to the same date, when the Commission's world-wide propaganda for charity to aid in maintaining the general *ravitaillement* and *secours* was interrupted, cash, food, and clothing to the amount of $28,500,000, of which $17,000,000 came from committees and persons in the British Empire, and $11,500,000 from the United States. In addition the Commission had to its credit, on June 1, 1917, an additional $5,000,000, temporarily accumulated in the course of its commercial operations, which may be referred to as "profit." All this so-called "profit" accumulation, however, is from time to time transferred to the Commission's strictly benevolent account. Altogether, therefore, the Commission had had available for its work, up to June 1st of this year, $297,000,000 in cash and goods.

This takes into no account the large sums given within Belgium by cities, communes, and strictly Belgian organisations, sums whose total is not known to us but cannot fall short, up to date, of 500,000,000 francs [approximately $100,000,000]. Nor does this latter figure include still another and quite unguessable amount, given directly as private charity from

Belgian to Belgian. Many small and several fairly large internal charities have had no subventions either from the Commission and Comité National or the communes.

It is, however, the money, food, and clothing received from American private charity, and the methods by which they have been acquired, that claim here our special interest. The great sum received by private gifts from British sources has been chiefly raised by the admirably organised and energetically directed campaign of the British National Committee for Belgian Relief, an organisation already referred to in an earlier chapter. This Committee has always worked in close coöperation with the Commission, but has managed its own affairs as to methods and details, turning over to the Commission, in London, the money, food, and clothing collected by it.

The "record" of all giving to Belgian relief is held by New Zealand, which from its population of 1,159,720 has sent to the National Committee $2,655,758, or a *per-capita* average of $2.29. Australia has given $1.34 per capita, Canada 22 cents, the United Kingdom 9 cents, while the contribution of the United States averages slightly more than 10 cents.

In America the Commission has directly managed the campaign for charity, with its New York office as organising and receiving headquarters. The work has been carried on partly by definitely organised committees in thirty-seven states, and by scattering local committees in other states. Many of these state committees have organised local committees in almost every county and large city in the states represented by them. Ohio, for example, has had some form of local organisation in eighty out of the eighty-eight counties in the state, and California has had nearly ninety local county and city committees reporting to the state committee.

As examples of the results of the work of the state committees, the following may be cited:

The New England Belgian Relief Fund was organised on October 19, 1914—that is, immediately on the publication of Mr. Hoover's first appeal. It soon became largely restricted to work in Massachusetts, and may be held to be fairly synonymous with a Massachusetts State organisation. From it the Commission, up to May 1, 1917, had received food valued at $214,142; clothing valued at $270,754; and $120,767 in cash; total $605,663. Two "Mas-

sachusetts Relief Ships," i.e., ships loaded with supplies from Massachusetts, or purchased with Massachusetts money, were despatched in January and March, 1915. They were the *Harpalyce* (sunk by torpedo or mine on a later relief voyage) and the *Lynorta.*

Illinois has also had a state organisation continuously active since October, 1914. Its contributions to May 1st were: food, value $128,556; clothing, value $38,314; cash $25,230; total $192,100.

Connecticut organised on November 1, 1914, and continued active to May 1, 1917, during which time it contributed food, clothing, and cash to a value of $79,292. On January 1, 1916, the *S.S. Pontoporus,* under the official designation of "Connecticut Food Ship," sailed for Rotterdam with a cargo of food and clothing, mostly from the Nutmeg State.

The Kansas Belgian Relief Fund was organised as a state committee on November 14, 1914. It also arranged for the sending of a Kansas State ship (the *Hannah*), which sailed in December, 1914, with a cargo made up of flour contributed by the Kansas millers. There were 176 cars of this Kansas gift flour. Altogether the Kansas organisation has con-

tributed food worth $246,085; clothing worth $8,469; and cash $3,428; total $257,983.

Maryland's State organisation has provided foodstuffs of the value of $69,701; clothing, value $11,798; and cash $80,240; total $161,739.

Ohio's State organisation, established January 4, 1915, included local committees in almost every county in the state. Its total contribution to May 1, 1917, has been: food, value $78,993; clothing, value $17,242; and cash $51,967; total $148,202.

Oregon's State committee was organised in November, 1914. It helped make up the cargo of the relief ship *Cranley*, which sailed from the west coast in January, 1915, carrying, also, food and clothing from California. Oregon's committee has contributed food worth $50,857; clothing worth $10,759; besides $8,059 in cash; total $69,675.

Michigan established a State committee in February, 1915. It furnished most of the cargo of a relief ship that sailed in July. Its total contribution of foodstuffs has been of a value of $36,047; clothing, value $52,244; and cash $8,450; total $96,741.

Pennsylvania began early and has carried on a most energetic campaign. It contributed, up to May 1, 1917, food of the value of $146,800; clothing to the value of $38,690; and cash $193,878; total $379,368.

Finally, to cite but one more example, California, the State of Mr. Hoover's adoption, and from which has come an unusual number of active Commission workers in Belgium, effected a State organisation in December, 1914. This organisation has contributed foodstuffs valued at $269,317; and clothing valued at $19,441. In addition it has sent in $154,553 in cash; making a total contribution, up to May 1, 1917, of the value of $443,311. It loaded and sent the relief ship *Camino* in December, 1916, and furnished most of the cargo of another relief ship, the *Cranley*. Much of the success of California's work is due to the constant stimulus received from the activities of the little town of Palo Alto, the "college town" of Stanford University, from which Mr. Hoover graduated in 1895. This village of 5,000 inhabitants and university of 2,000 students (many included in the village population) has contributed a total of nearly $15,000 to the relief of Belgium. It

Group of children of a communal school ready to receive the visit of a Commission representative

Teacher and boy pupils of a communal school of Brussels assembled to greet a Commission representative

Testimonials of gratitude made by Belgian school children and presented to the Commission

was in Palo Alto that the first picturesque outdoor "Belgian Market" was held, the success of which led to a second one there and also one in San Francisco, and several elsewhere in the country.

The examples of State work cited are but samples. Other State committees did as nobly, and splendid contributions and loaded relief ships came from still other states in which no attempt was made to effect organised State committees. In fact, State organisation was only one of many means adopted for carrying on the nation-wide propaganda for Belgian relief. Numerous special funds were raised by various organisations and privately instituted movements. An early example of these was the "Millers' Belgian Relief" movement, organised and directed by the editor of the *Northwestern Miller*, Mr. William C. Edgar, which resulted in the contribution of a shipload of flour, valued at $466,301, which was carried from Philadelphia to Rotterdam in February, 1915, by the *S.S. South Point.* The organiser of this splendid contribution accompanied his flour cargo all the way to its destination in Belgium. There he actually saw its final distribution to the Commission's provincial storehouses. The good

Samaritan ship was sunk by a German submarine on her return trip.

The Rockefeller Foundation contributed a million dollars, which was sufficient to load, wholly or partly, five relief ships, part of the cargoes coming from contributions from the Belgian Relief Fund, which also contributed supplies for another relief ship, to the value of half a million dollars. (The Belgian Relief Fund is composed of money given directly to representatives of the expatriated Belgian Government at Le Havre, and is chiefly used for relief work in free Belgium. A considerable part of it is being retained for restoration work after the war ceases).

The American Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution made a wide appeal, culminating in a Belgian Flag Day on April 8, 1916, the forty-first anniversary of King Albert's birthday. This appeal provided more than $150,000 and was personally acknowledged by Queen Elizabeth in a cable of thanks to the Society.

In June, 1916, a great Allied Bazaar was held in New York under the auspices of three relief organisations, of which the Commission was one. The Commission's share of the net receipts was $115,000.

A bazaar was held at Boston in December, 1916, from which $20,000 came to the Commission, and one in Chicago which yielded $11,675 for Belgian relief.

In December, 1916, the mining engineers of the country, as a special testimonial to the mining engineer at the head of the Commission, organised the "Belgian Kiddies, Ltd.," a corporation for the raising of money to feed 10,000 Belgian children for one year. Up to May 1, 1917, they had collected $85,000 for this beautiful special charity. The Rocky Mountain Club, another great body of engineers, in a similar campaign at the beginning of the year, raised $245,986. A large part of this money had been assembled by the club to build itself a new club house in New York. The members decided that feeding Belgian children would make them happier than housing themselves in luxury while Belgian children were starving.

The New York Chamber of Commerce also enlisted itself in the Commission's 1917 campaign on behalf of the children of Belgium, and collected $69,625 for this purpose up to May 1st. The Cardinal Gibbons Fund for the same purpose had collected, up

to May 1, $77,000 from the Catholic children of America and their parents. This Fund was established as the direct answer to a personal public appeal from the Pope, headed by a personal contribution from His Holiness. The Dollar Christmas Fund, organised by Mr. Henry Clews, has collected during the month of December of each year, particularly at Christmastide, money which now amounts to $95,300.

Finally, special mention must be made of the brilliant success of the *Literary Digest* Fund for the children of Belgium, which, under the active direction of Mr. R. J. Cuddihy, has collected from all over the country, in sums from pennies to thousands of dollars, more than half a million dollars, now being expended for the maintenance of the weak and destitute children of the "little land of sorrows."

Besides all these and other organised collections of funds, the Commission has received many single private gifts of large size, notably one of $210,000, another of $200,000, several of $100,000, and many of more than $10,000. But the great majority of the gifts made to the Commission through State

committees or through special fund organisations, or directly to the New York office, have been in small sums coming from millions of individuals. And it is a beautiful thing that it has been so. It would be interesting indeed to know just how many of the 105,000,000 inhabitants of the United States have contributed personally to Belgian relief. We can never know this with any approach to accuracy, but we do know enough to say that the givers number several millions.

Thousands of incidents, pathetic, inspiriting, noble, connected with the giving, clamour for the telling.

A number of little girls in a charity home in Cooperstown, N. Y., sent $1 each month. These little girls are rewarded by a few pennies for any particular excellence in their tasks, making beds, sweeping, etc., and for months they gave enough pennies earned in this way to send this dollar for the children of Belgium.

A little country school near Montara lighthouse, on the Pacific Coast, gave its playtime to knitting wool caps and mittens and mufflers, and then the school children brought pennies from their little metal banks, and jars of preserved fruit, and home-made jam, and the girl school teacher put them all,

pennies, jam, and mittens, into her one-horse buggy and drove forty miles through a storm to convey these more-than-royal gifts to the California Committee's office in San Francisco.

A druggist in a small town in Indiana sent one dollar a week for more than two years; a country grocer sent, each week, a fixed percentage of his profits; a man without money, but with a gold watch left as a family heirloom, sent it in to be sold for the feeding of a Belgium family.

Over in Rotterdam and in Belgium, too, we had our glimpses of the incidents of giving. There are three fascinating old-fashioned wedding dresses draped on forms that stand just inside the entrance of the great Antwerp clothing *ouvrior*. These dresses were rescued by Mme. Osterrieth from the cases of used clothing that came from America. She has not let them go to the benches to be torn apart and made over, but has kept them intact to speak their message of sympathy to every one who sees them, and especially to the eight hundred saved women and girls who find employment in the *ouvrior* in working over the masses of gift clothing, new and old, that go to the share of Antwerp.

In the pockets of many of the garments sent over have been found messages of sympathy and cheer. Other messages admonish the finders to see in these gifts the hand of God, and to "get right with Him." In the pocket of a fancy waistcoat was a quarter, wrapped in a bit of paper, on which was written: "Have a drink with me. Good luck!" In many of the parcels are English Bibles, the good souls who sent them not realising that few Belgians can read English. In fact, the enclosing of messages and books caused us much trouble, for the Germans allow no scrap of paper, printed or written, to enter Belgium uncensored. We now have to unpack all the clothing in Rotterdam and go through it carefully to remove all notes and books.

But I must not run on. Volumes would not contain all the incidents, but a page of the incidents speaks volumes. Tears and smiles and heart thrills and thanksgiving for the revelation of the human love of humanity in these terrible days of a depressing pessimism. The giving has been so worth while; worth while to Belgium, saved from starvation of the body; worth while to America, saved from starvation of the soul.

If I could only make real to the hosts of volunteer Belgian relief workers in America, the organisers and managers of the State committees, the local committees, the special committees and groups, and to the donors of the money, whether in pennies or dollars, or checks for thousands, and the senders of food, whether glasses of jam or shiploads of flour, and the givers of clothing and makers of mittens and mufflers; if I could only make real and vivid to all these unnamed American men and women and children of overflowing heart and quick sympathy who have given their work and devotion and self-sacrifice for unfortunate Belgium, the words and the gestures of gratitude of the Belgian men and women and children, I should be ineffably glad. Because this deep and undying gratitude ought to be known to the millions over here who have deserved it. I have been caused more gulps and tears in Belgium from the gratitude of the Belgians than from their suffering. And this gratitude is meant as much for those millions over here who worked and helped as for the few score who had the privilege to work and help over there.

CHAPTER EIGHT

HOW THE FOOD CAME OVER SEAS TO BELGIUM

WE MUST leave the half-told story of the collecting of the money for a glimpse of the great commercial activities involved in the buying and sending of the food. Although much of it, especially in the beginning months of the work, was bought directly by the givers in their various States and regions, some of it in large quantities by committees, as in the case of the special relief ships, and some of it in small quantities by the individual givers, the greater part of the food sent to Belgium has been bought by the New York and London offices of the Commission, which have an elaborate purchasing and shipping machinery.

As a matter of fact, the purchase and sending to us of food in small quantities gave us much trouble, and was necessarily a very uneconomical way of handling the matter. Much of the food privately bought was of the nature of luxuries. The givers assumed that the Commission would look out for the

staples, and they wished to add special comforts and delicacies for the weak and ill. These small packages of special kinds of food, not on our regular programme of importation, came by tens of thousands, many of them in special "green label" or "blue label," or "red stripe" parcels arranged by communities or groups to be sold at fixed prices by certain grocers, and containing a fixed and varied special ration for a week or fortnight. It was difficult to arrange for an equitable distribution of this food. Many as were the packages, they were not enough to go round among the whole population. We gave some, containing delicacies, to hospitals; some to schools. Some we distributed among the Belgian provincial committees in proportion to the population of their provinces, with permission to sell the luxuries in special little "American food shops" to people able to pay well for them, the money thus obtained to be used in buying the staple necessities for the destitute of the province. One of our American delegates used to load his motor car with packages of jam and fancy crackers and whatnot, and rush around his province on Belgian festival days, making presents to children's canteens, hospi-

tals, convents, and schools. He came to be looked on as a continuously appearing Santa Claus!

Rice from Rangoon, corn from Argentina, beans from Manchuria, wheat and meat and fats from America; and all, with the other things of the regular programme, such as sugar, condensed milk, coffee and cocoa, salt, salad oil, yeast, dried fish, etc., in great quantities, to be brought across wide oceans, through the dangerous mine-strewn Channel, and landed safely and regularly in Rotterdam, to be there speedily transferred from ocean vessels into canal boats and urged on into Belgium and Northern France, and from these taken again by railroad cars and horse-drawn carts to the communal warehouses and soup kitchens; and always and ever, through all the months, to get there *in time*—these were the buying and transporting problems of the Commission. One hundred thousand tons a month of foodstuffs from the world over, in great shiploads to Rotterdam; one hundred thousand tons a month thence in ever more and more divided quantities to the province and district storehouses, to the regional storehouses and mills, to the communal centres, and finally to the mouths of the people.

And all to be done economically, speedily, and regularly; to be done, that is, with "engineering efficiency."

Well, it has been done; that is the story in a sentence. By virtue of a devoted volunteer direction; by constant resort to sympathetic Governments, commercial firms, banks, and transportation companies for advice and concessions; by shrewd purchasing on a great scale in primary markets; by the chartering and control of shipping solely for the Commission's service and under the protection of the Commission's flag, recognised, like the emblem of the Red Cross, by belligerent and neutral Governments alike, the great undertaking has gone on, efficiently and economically, for three years. A measure of the efficiency and economy with which it has gone on is found in the fact that the overhead expense of the work has been less than three quarters of one per cent. of the values involved. But a truer measure to the imprisoned Belgians and the French of the efficiency and economy of this volunteer undertaking is found in the continuous presence of food in the steel-encircled countries, and the low prices at which this food has been delivered to those who could

pay. The price of bread in Brussels has never been more, and has usually been less, than that in London and Paris.

The Commission's ships cross the ocean under their own special flag and markings. In these three years of sea raiders, submarines, and mines, the oceans have been no safe place for ordinary ships. But the Commission had sent, up to July 1, 1917, 484 shiploads of food and clothing across the seas with a loss of but eighteen ships, and four damaged. Each ship carried a pair of great cloth banners, 9 by 100 feet, stretching along the hull on each side; also two 50-foot pennants flying from the mast head; a house flag 12 by 15 feet; a pair of deck cloths, 12 by 50 feet, to be stretched across the deck face up, one forward and one aft; and two huge red- and white-striped signal balls, eight feet in diameter, attached at the tops of two masts. The balls and flat deck cloths are for the benefit of airplane pilots; the side cloths, pennants, and house flag are for sea raiders and submarines. All the flags and cloths are white, with the Commission's name or initials (C. R. B.) in great red letters on them. The masters of the ships have special passes from the German diplomatic

authorities in the country from which they start. In these days of barred zones the ships must follow certain determined courses, approaching Rotterdam, not through the English Channel, but going up around the north of Ireland and Scotland, then across to and down by the Norwegian coast, and then nearly straight south through a narrow free zone lying between the English mine field off Heligoland and the danger zone along the English coast where the Germans torpedo any ship without warning. Some of our losses have been due to the carelessness of ships' captains, too impatient of such restricted safe waters, but a few have been due to an equal carelessness—if we shall use no harsher term—on the part of the submarine commanders.

For example, when the Germans had declared their submarine blockade of the British Islands and France, and on February 1st of this year published the outlines of the so-called barred or danger zone, a serious interruption in the Commission's shipping service to Rotterdam occurred at once. The Channel route was wholly "closed" to all ships, and the outlined free or "safe" north-about route through the North Sea was dangerous because of mine fields.

Under strong pressure from the Commission and from Holland (whose people are as dependent, in some ways, as the Belgians on the continuous importation of food, especially feed for their dairy stock), the German Government finally modified the outlines of its danger zone in the North Sea. Holland and the Commission were notified that after March 15th their ships could come and go with certain safety through a narrow free zone extending from the Dutch coast north and northwest to the Faroe Islands. The Commission thereupon instructed five of its ships, which it had been holding empty in Rotterdam harbour for some time, to start for America to reload. As an extra precaution we held these ships for an extra day, despite the fact that every day's delay, at that time, meant additional privations in Belgium. On the night of March 16th, therefore, they started out. On the afternoon of the next day two of these boats were deliberately shelled in the "safe" zone by a German submarine, and six sailors on one of them, the *Haelen*, were killed.

We hurried to the German Legation at The Hague. They took the matter coolly. In answer to

our protests and our pointing out of the terrible result that such a thing would have on the whole course of our work—for if we could not guarantee safety to our ships none would continue in our service, and the whole feeding of the imprisoned Belgians and French would break down—the Legation's First Secretary simply said, with a shrug: "There has been a stupidity."

"Where? What?" we demanded. "Haven't all the submarine commanders received their proper orders?"

We had waited more than a month, an anxious month for us and Belgians and Hollanders alike, for the lapsing of the time demanded by the Germans as necessary for the proper instruction of their submarines as they came home singly and in groups to their bases from their trips outside. And now it seemed that we must wait still longer.

"Oh yes," was the reply, "all of them, absolutely all, have been instructed not to molest your ships and Holland's ships in the free zone."

"Then what is the matter?"

Again the speaking shrug of the shoulders, and the curt reply: "Some submarine commander has been

One of the State relief ships, showing the conspicuous side cloths, long pennants, etc., used on all ships carrying cargoes for the Commission to make them easily recognizable even at long distances.

Flour in sacks specially stamped to show that it is "relief flour" and whence it came. Thousands of these sacks, when empty, have been decorated by Belgian women and children and given back to the Commission, as evidence of gratitude.

Commission tugs and barges moving through ice in Rotterdam harbor



Quick unloading of a relief cargo of wheat in Rotterdam harbor by the Commission's floating elevators

a stupid pig. We shall find out later—and reprimand him."

They may have found out. We didn't. It didn't matter to us what particular young commander had done it. It simply mattered that we might lose our whole shipping service if this kind of thing went on.

Once in Rotterdam, the great ships become the centres of extraordinary activity. Giant floating elevators come up to them, sometimes one or two on each side, and a group of empty canal boats cluster around. The hungry pipes of the elevators are thrust down into the mass of wheat in the hold, and other pipes are let down into the lighters; then the precious wheat streams run up and out of the ship and down and into the canal boats.

Or it may be that the ship's cargo is of boxes of bacon, barrels of lard, cases of clothing and shoes, and whatnot. If so, a mob of stevedores takes the place of the elevators. In either case it is speed that is demanded, and that is obtained; always the essence of the contract of feeding Belgium and Northern France has been time.

As soon as one canal boat is filled, another takes

its place. Nor do they make delay in starting away with their life-saving cargoes. Along the tortuous waterways of Holland and on to the sentry-guarded Belgian frontier, with its fatal electrified wire, the canal boats move, not dragged slowly, as in old times, by plodding horses or men, but pulled as swiftly as may safely be, in long strings by strong tugs, or driven by their own gasolene engines.

The Commission has made records in Rotterdam harbour. No such speed of trans-shipment had been known there in good old Dutch days; for three years now there have been American days along the Boompjes and in the harbour basins. Up to July 1, 1917, 484 overseas cargoes and 1,008 cross-channel cargoes had been unloaded in Rotterdam by the Commission, and 7,084 canal-boat loads despatched into Belgium and Northern France. In addition, when Holland's weather was so unkind to us last winter—however much the skating Dutchmen and their Queen enjoyed it—and froze and kept frozen for six weeks all the canals, some thousands of rail-road cars were used by arrangement with Holland and the German Government of Belgium.

Sometimes the ships came fairly crowding each

other into Rotterdam. On June 1, 1916, 31,342 tons of Commission foodstuffs arrived. Then there were strenuous hours to earn despatch money. And sometimes they came with long intervals between, with a consequent shortening of the food stocks inside of Belgium—for the eating went on steadily, however irregular the arrival of the wherewithal to eat. Then there were strenuous hours again, for there were needed swift loading and hard driving of the canal boats out of the harbour basins into and along the canals. On a single day in October, 1916, 19,557 tons of foodstuffs were started off for Belgium in the canal boats. As these boats carry on the average about 350 tons each, this meant the getting away of a fleet of nearly sixty boats.

The shortest distance for any of these canal boats to travel is that to Antwerp, 140 kilometres (about 88 miles); the longest that to La Louviére, 376 kilometres (235 miles).

If the Germans have often given us some trouble about our overseas shipping, so have they also in connection with our fleet of canal boats. Not, we may assume, from a dangerous viciousness, but mostly, perhaps, from a no less dangerous stupidity.

Never did our Brussels office have a more nerve-racking time than during a certain period in the summer of 1916 when, without a whisper of warning, Governor General von Bissing's Government suddenly tied up our whole canal-boat fleet by an order permitting no canal boat to pass out from Belgium into Holland without depositing the full value of the boat before crossing the frontier. The Governor General had reason to fear, he said, that some of the boats that went out didn't come back, some of them, it was whispered, even going across the Channel to England. As these boats are worth, roughly, about $5,000 each, and we were using about 500 boats, it would have tied up two and a half million dollars of our money to meet this demand, and tied it up in German hands! We simply couldn't do it. So we began negotiations.

Oh, the innumerable beginnings of negotiations, and, oh, the interminable enduring of negotiations, the struggling against form and "system," against obstinate and cruel delay—for delay in food matters in Belgium was always cruel—and sometimes against sheer brutality! How often have we longed to say: Here, take these ten million people and feed them

or starve them as you will! We quit. We can't go on fighting your floating mines and stupid submarines; your brutal soldiers and more brutal bureaucrats. Live up to your agreements to help us, or at least do not obstruct us; or, if you won't, then formally and officially and publicly before the world kick us out as your arch-jingo, Reventlow, demands.

But we couldn't say it; we couldn't risk it; it was too certain to have been starving rather than feeding.

We arranged the matter of the canal boats, of course. But it took time, and brought us terribly close to empty warehouses—and empty stomachs. In the course of the negotiations, when we saw the food situation getting more and more desperate, as each fruitless day of talking went by, we lost our self-control, and let two "undiplomatic" letters run off from our nervous finger tips to two high officials in General von Bissing's Government. One of these letters was written by Mr. Poland, the assistant director (now director of the London office), and in it he suggested that the whole negotiation could be settled in two hours if common sense were given some place in the matter; and the other was one from me suggesting that it was difficult to understand why it

should take a letter from America as long to reach our office after it had arrived in Brussels as it took it to arrive in Brussels from New York. I implied, I presume, a certain unnecessary leisureliness in the work of the official censor.

We were immediately told—no delay in this case—that such letters could not be received by His Excellency's Government, and it was suggested that the Commission not only withdraw the letters, but also the letter-writers! More negotiations were necessary!

Mr. Hoover happened to arrive from London just as things were warmest—it was a habit he had. And he took a hand in the new negotiations. He explained that it should be remembered that the culprits were both crude Americans who were unaccustomed to the niceties of diplomatic form, and that our letters were couched in the regular approved manner of American business men. He was sorry, and we were sorry, that they seemed impertinent; they were not intended to be. . . . So the director and assistant-director stayed on to fight another day.

CHAPTER NINE

THE AMERICANS AND THE BELGIANS

WHEN the New York and London offices of the Commission had purchased the supplies and seen to their transportation overseas, and the Rotterdam office had received and trans-shipped them into canal boats or railway cars, and started them on their way to Belgium and France, they were thereafter in charge of that part of the Commission organisation which was within the German-occupied territory. Everything that was later done by the Commission with the food and clothing was done by that part of it working in Belgium, and it was done under formal and informal agreements and arrangements with the German authorities in control of Belgium. The more formal of these agreements have already been explained.

But also all that was done inside of Belgium was done in agreement and close coöperation with the extensive and highly developed volunteer Belgian relief organisation, composed at bottom of the (ap-

proximately) three thousand communal committees; then, above them, the regional committees representing groups of communes; then, still over these, the provincial committees, one for each province in the country; and finally, at top, the Belgian national committee.

To define, as well as might be defined in words, the special functions and position of each of the two parts of the combined relief organisation, and the general relations to be maintained between them, various formulations of agreement have been drafted from time to time. The first written-out general scheme of organisation bears date of December, 1914. Before that, of course, had come the all-important meeting in London, in October, 1914, between Mr. Hoover and M. Francqui, the organising and directing heads of the two groups, at which a general agreement as to fundamentals was reached.

The last general agreement was written out in December, 1916, and was drawn up in the light of all the experience of two years of work. It was intended to do away with any possible future misunderstandings concerning any phase of the relations of the two groups, and was drafted and

signed as a formal agreement between the directing heads.

In any complete history of the Commission's work these agreements with our Belgian co-workers must be fully given. No space for that is possible here. But certain essential points of the arrangements must be given in order that the important and delicate position of the Americans working in Belgium can be in some measure understood.

I quote from the "general scheme" of December, 1914, which was drafted chiefly to point out the position of the Commission's provincial representatives:

"As the *Comité National* will control its work through ten sub-committees, or *Comités Provinciaux*, each covering a province of Belgium [one province, Brabant, is subdivided for purposes of food administration into two, one being Greater Brussels, and the other all of Brabant province outside of Brussels] and each having its own president and working organisation, the Commission for Relief in Belgium proposes to station an authorised delegate (with one or more assistants) in each province, at the point where the principal office of the *Comité Provincial*,

with its president, is located. The *Comité National* will also station a delegate or two delegates, as the case may require, at the same office, who will represent the central organisation at Brussels.

"The head delegate of the C. R. B., the delegate of the C. N., and the president of the C. P. will form the three principals for the affairs of the relief work in the province.

"But as it has been clearly stipulated that the grain or other merchandise introduced into Belgium by the C. R. B. is under the responsibility of their Excellencies the Ministers of the United States and of Spain, who are the protectors of the Commission, it is essential that the merchandise remain the property of the C. R. B. until the same is distributed to the communes. . . . Therefore, in spite of the fact that the merchandise may be entrusted for handling to the Provincial Committee . . . the delegate of the C. R. B. is still responsible for its safety until it is delivered to the communes."

The various provincial delegates of the Commission were responsible for the protection of the supplies from possible German seizure, and for seeing

that all plans proposed by the Provincial Committee in no way contravened the general principles and plans of the Commission regarding fair distribution; they viséd all directions of the Provincial Committee as to milling, storage, distribution, etc.; they checked up all shipments coming into their provinces to see that they corresponded as to weight, quantity, and character with the advices from Rotterdam; kept the Brussels office informed constantly and in utmost detail of all receipts, movements and distribution of supplies in each province; they took regular monthly inventories of all stocks on hand, made representation of all general and special needs of each region and people, saw to an efficient inspection and control of the use and abuse of the food, even to the degree, if necessary, of using their power of absolute prohibition of movement of the food stocks under their control to correct abuses.

As a matter of fact, the Commission province delegate acted as no tyrant; he coöperated, rather, in all ways with the well-organised, devoted, and hard-working provincial, regional, and communal Belgian committees; struggled for them and for the people generally with the German authorities, and

came to be the loyal and energetic protector and helper of all in his province.

These are the bald and meagre statements of the responsibility, duties, and activities of the American *délégués* in Belgium. But no statement could ever be drafted that would set out in full what really were their responsibilities and duties, what their work and behaviour were to be, what delicacies of situation were to be met, what discretion was to be exercised, what kind of extraordinary experience altogether they were to meet and meet acceptably for the sake of maintenance of the lives of Belgian men, women, and children, and the honour of American humanitarian achievement.

Let us turn our attention to some details of the work, to some of its difficulties, and some of its successes and satisfactions. But, first, just a few things concerning the *personnel* of the Commission.

Who were these young—and few older—Americans? How were they selected? What did their personality mean to the Belgians, and what did Belgium mean to them? The answers to these questions should some day be told by a man of vision, dramatic instinct, sense of humour and well-trained

hand—another Richard Harding Davis. They could be so answered by this man as to make a story to be read with satisfaction. But here there can be no question of a story. We must be matter-of-fact and concise.

The total roll of these men, successive resident directors, assistant directors, head delegates, assistants and all, makes a list of hardly one hundred and fifty. Other men of the Commission were as busy; did as faithful and as important work in the Rotterdam, London, and New York offices; but it was the men privileged to work inside of Belgium and France who had the personal experiences they can tell to their wondering children in future years; who lived something that already seems almost unreal, almost impossible.

The few older men of the Commission—from among whom most of the directors and executive officers of the New York, London, Brussels, and Rotterdam officers were drawn, although some took their places among the younger men as province delegates—were successful engineers [Mr. Hoover drew his volunteers first of all from his engineer friends], half a dozen college professors, a lawyer of

large practice, two clergymen of practical turn of mind, a well-known explorer and sportsman, a dietetic expert, an architect of high repute, a magazine editor, a famous forester, a stock broker, a consul, an expert in children's diseases; altogether a wholesome variety!

But the majority of the men, especially those who worked in Belgium and the occupied portion of France, were young men, representatives of an American type. They came from forty-five different American colleges and universities; more from Harvard than any other one. Twenty of them had been selected by their colleges and their States to be Rhodes Scholars in Oxford University. These twenty had been thus already selected on a basis of youthful scholarship, energy, general capacity, and good-fellowship. They had not, however, been selected on a basis of experience in business or—least of all—relief work. And the rest of the one hundred and fifty were selected by us on about the same general grounds, adding the more special one of a usable, or buddingly usable, knowledge of the French language. Several could read German, a few speak it. That was also useful. But the Com-

mission asked primarily for intelligence, character, youthful vigour, and enthusiasm, rather than specific attainments or experience.

Two things most of these men had that I have not mentioned. But they were two important things, namely, idealism and a sense of humour; a supporting idealism, and a saving sense of humour. Curtis, the first of our Brussels-Holland couriers, had to have these qualities to stand his seventeen arrests by German sentries, and Warren his three days in a military prison at Antwerp, and yet keep unconcernedly on with their work. Curtis's sense of humour was fortunately well matched by a German's—a single German's—when the young American, a little annoyed by an unusual number of stoppings on the road one day, handed his pass to the tenth man who demanded it, with a swift, highly uncomplimentary personal allusion to his tormentor, in pure Americanese. The sentry handed it back with a dry, "Much obliged, the same to you." He was probably a formerly-of-Chicago reservist who knew the argot.

Later, to save much fumbling in pockets, many of our men carried their passes spread out in leather

frames with transparent celluloid covers, suspended by a strap around the neck. For this they earned the name of "*Les Aveugles*" among the Belgians.

In the early days of the work, when matters went with some irregularity and the German petty rigidities made more irritation than they did when we had become more hardened to them, the American delegate at Liége is said to have written his confrère at Namur as follows:

DEAR DELEGATE:

I started three canal boats last week for Namur. I thought it safer to send three in order that one should finally reach you. The "*Attends Je Viens*" has already been stopped—the towing horse had no passport. I hear that the "*Marchons Toujours*" is also not likely to get through, as the skipper's wife has given birth to a baby *en voyage* whose photo is, naturally, not on the passport. Betting is strong, however, on the "*Laisse-moi Tranquille.*" Be sure to take up the bottom planks when she arrives, as I understand Rotterdam thinks she may be carrying contraband.

But not all the humour came from the Americans —though perhaps all the conscious jesting did. How is this contribution from the German side? The military commander of the village of Marchiennes sent this telegram to a superior:

(Translation)

August 28, 1915.

Flora Roch, age 20, of Boevry, hair fair, eyes blue, nose and mouth ordinary, has till now supplied Marchiennes district with yeast, indispensable for baking but not obtainable in district; the Etappen-Kommandatur requests permission for Flora Roch to continue supplying this Etappen district with yeast from Tournai in Belgium.

(s) Et. Dktr. Marchiennes.

On the back of the telegram was this endorsement by the superior officer:

(Translation)

According to determined rules of June 9, 1915, between A O K 6 and the Gen. Government—Sec-

tion 1b 4317—the request of the Etappen-Inspection Marchiennes seems legitimate.

But mostly the humour was only the flash of bright moments in days that had much darkness in them. The stern necessities of the work and the distressing scenes of the soup-lines and canteens filled most of the hours, and gave most of the colour to the days and weeks and months that seemed always to be leading, but never quite coming up to, the peace and end of it all that we persisted in seeing just ahead. If it had not been for this confidence in the near coming of peace, shared by Americans and Belgians alike, a confidence curiously persistent despite the constant passing of the successive dates set by us for the peace-coming, I doubt that we could have carried on. The difficulties of a permanent maintenance of the relief seemed every now and then quite too serious to be overcome—but we could always make shift to go along for a few weeks or months longer, that is, until peace came.

The spirits of the American group could always rebound from the effect of each disappointment. One thing that helped was the activity and move-

ment demanded of the delegates by the nature of their work. Only the few of us who were kept close to the central office in Brussels felt the depression of physical inaction. Our relief came from the constant coming in from the provinces of the busy and excited delegates with reports of new troubles or new successes.

Sometimes one or more of the men would not be allowed by the German military authorities to come in to Brussels for some time; the delegate stationed at St. Quentin was once held for seven weeks, during a time of active military operations along the front of his district. The men, especially those from Northern France, often had exciting tales to tell of their proximity to shell fire or bursting bombs from raiding French and English fliers which, instead of discouraging other young men from any desire to work there—as they might have discouraged older ones—only increased the list of candidates for the district.

CHAPTER TEN

CANAL BOATS AND TROUBLES

AS for details of the work itself, they crowd forward for recognition. How begin? How choose among the many phases of the work the few that may be touched on? For choose one must. Perhaps the matter of internal transport and distribution comes properly first in order. For the food had certainly first to be carried to all parts of the country before it could be given out to the people.

We already know—I have already said it several times—that when the supplies reached Rotterdam in the overseas ships, they were trans-shipped into canal boats and railroad cars and sent on through Holland into Belgium and Northern France. Nothing easier to say, but perhaps nothing harder to do in all the Commission's undertaking. Seven thousand canal-boat and several thousand railroad-car loads of food and clothing—altogether nearly three million tons; an average of almost one hundred

thousand tons a month for two and a half years—to be moved distances varying from eighty-five to two hundred and twenty-five miles, through a country disorganised and impotent as regards the desire of its own people to help, and very much over-organised and brutally potent as regards the attitude and control of the invaders, who seemed stupidly antagonistic, even when they pretended to be willing to help. And all these boats and cars with their life-saving loads to be moved on time. Tons of wheat and beans and bacon are perfectly useless to people just dead of starvation.

The Ten Commandments for the American Commission and the Belgian National Committee were all concentrated in one: Feed the People Regularly, no matter the cost in energy, in compromise, in money; no matter the difficulty or the sore discouragement; keep the food coming in; keep it going to the mouths of all. That the Commission managed to obey its Ten Commandments in one, the fact that no commune of all the 5,000 in the Belgian and French occupied territory missed for a single day its ration of bread, from the time the Americans came in until they went out, is the sufficient evidence.

But I want to point out a few details of the difficulties under which the Commission laboured, and the methods used by it, in solving a single one of its problems, namely, that of internal transportation, which was the basic problem in all the work after the supplies had once reached Rotterdam.

In doing this I avail myself of certain notes recently prepared by Mr. Prentiss Gray, for nine months assistant director of the Commission in Brussels, and director for that last strenuous month of April of this year after America had declared war, and all but a small group, left to close up accounts and turn over affairs to the Spanish and Dutch neutrals who succeeded us in Belgium, had gone out. Mr. Gray had a large share in the successful maintenance of the transport system during the whole time of his service.

First is to be remembered the complete paralysis of all means of transport in Belgium immediately following the occupation by the German arms. A large number of Belgian canal boats had been requisitioned by the Germans. Another large number had been taken from the country before the advancing armies had overrun the whole of it, and all these,

until some agreement of subsequent non-requisition had been reached, steadfastly—and wisely—were kept away for fear of seizure. The canals in many places had been broken, locks blown up, and many barges had been sunk in the narrow waterways. Most of the rolling-stock of the Belgian railroads had been run off into France in front of the advancing German armies, and many railroad bridges destroyed. All lines of communication not rendered inoperative were taken over by the army and restricted to military transport. All freedom of movement of the people was withdrawn; the use of telephones interdicted and most lines cut; the telegraph was limited to army use.

For months after the incoming of the invaders it was impossible to learn the actual conditions of the canals, or to keep in constant touch with the canal boats in their progress along the few waterways that were usable and were used by the Commission in its first movement of supplies. It was not until the end of December, 1914, two months after the work began, that the Commission had been able to collect the necessary accurate data concerning the conditions of all the canals, and the width, depth, and length of all the locks. Nor was it possible for some

time to get a definite understanding of the conditions of movement that the German authorities intended to impose on the canal boats and boatmen engaged by the Commission.

Finally, matters were arranged with some approach to definiteness, and an organisation of the canal-boat service of a workable kind was effected.

The boats used were Dutch as well as Belgian and were first chartered either for single trips or for various time periods in which several trips would be made. Finally, because of constant difficulties in the matter of chartering, due principally to constant interference by the German authorities, the Commission arranged for the organisation of a "ship owning department," which, although essentially a Belgian organisation in connection with the Provincial Committee of Antwerp, acted as the agent of the Commission in purchasing, time-chartering, and managing canal boats and tugs. This arrangement, put through only after overcoming much opposition from the German authorities and suffering heart-breaking delays and interference on their part, resulted in giving us a fleet of 500 canal boats and 35 tugs under our own control.

The work of internal transport followed—when it went according to programme—the following general course.

On the receipt of advices from the Commission's New York or London office that a ship had sailed with a given cargo, the Rotterdam office immediately made out a division list of the cargo in accordance with the needs of the various Belgian provinces. These needs, constantly compiled in Brussels, were as constantly made known in Rotterdam, and served as basis for the assignments of each cargo.

The canal-boat department of the Rotterdam office would arrange to have sufficient boats ready for the trans-shipment of the overseas cargo immediately on its arrival. The boat inspectors examined them to see that they complied with all of the regulations of the Dutch Customs, and to see that there was no means of entering the hold of the canal boat when once it had been sealed after loading. The boat was preparing for a long trip through a country filled with hungry Belgians—and hardly less hungry Germans—and the one insurance that the cargo would arrive intact in the hands of the American delegate at the point of destination was the absolute sealing

of the boat. Our men were not allowed to accompany a canal boat, but they could inspect it at almost every point on its journey. In Brussels a large chart indicated the position every day of every moving canal boat.

On arrival, then, of the overseas ship in Rotterdam, the allotted canal boats were immediately put alongside and the rapid and often record-breaking trans-shipment of cargo occurred. It was done under the eyes of Dutch Customs officials and Commission inspectors, who watched every phase of the work and verified the weighing of the cargo with great exactitude.

Simultaneously with the loading, the pass formalities were complied with. A photographer made photographs of all members of the crew for the passports. These passes were of different kinds, according to whether the canal boats were Dutch, and hence not subject to seizure in Belgium by the Germans, or Belgian (except those that had escaped from Belgium before a certain date, and had been excepted from seizure if they returned, and were hence known as "free boats") which were subject to seizure and for return of which to Belgium after going at any

time to Holland for a cargo, the Commission was responsible to the German authorities. In the event of the refusal of any such boat to go back into Belgium, the Commission was to pay its full value to the Germans. To insure this payment the Germans compelled us to keep a sum of 100,000 francs ($20,000) in their hands.

Each canal boat flew a large flag marked "Commission for Relief in Belgium," and a larger canvas banner bearing the serial number of the shipment.

Thus equipped and ready for their journey, the boats were arranged in strings for towing. This towage was done chiefly by tugs under charter to the Commission. On certain canals, however, only horse or man towage was allowed, and as the Germans were constantly sweeping the country of horses, the pulling of the boats on these canals was done chiefly by men. From Rotterdam, then, the strings of boats would start over their first or main routes; via the Ghent Canal for Ghent, Bruges, Courtrai, Western Hainault, Lille, and Valenciennes; via the Antwerp Canal for Antwerp, Brussels, Louvain, or for transshipment at these points to rail for Luxemburg and Northern France (except Lille and Valenciennes); or

via the Liége Canal for Hasselt, Liége, Namur, and Eastern Hainault. After the boats passed the Belgian border they came under the immediate control of the Brussels office, which could change their course and destinations if the exigencies of the situation inside the country demanded.

During the early days of the work, gifts of food of extremely various kinds poured into Rotterdam for the Commission from America and Great Britain. This variety of food came to be a source of much trouble. It made it difficult to load the canal boats to best effect, and it was almost impossible to distribute it fairly. A single canal boat departed from Rotterdam one day with forty-eight different kinds of food. It was this difficulty of economical transport and fair distribution that led the Commission to adopt the policy, sometimes criticised by unthinking persons, of selling many of the gifts of food miscellany and luxuries to those in Belgium who could afford to buy them, and using the money for the purchase of the much more necessary staples to be given to the destitute.

The distribution of the canal-boat cargoes in Bel-

gium and Northern France was determined by the Brussels office on the basis of inventories taken in the first part of each month, showing the stocks on hand and the rate of consumption in each region. The ration was not made uniform over the whole country, but varied according to the special needs of different regions. It was felt that the agricultural communities, where green vegetables and potatoes were grown and could be had, should not receive so large a quantity of imported foods as the large cities and industrial regions. The fairness of the distribution came, indeed, to be a burning question in all the relief work.

Often, when the stocks in the provinces approached low ebb, all the earlier plans of distribution had to be cast aside and the canal boats shunted about the waterways to relieve those sections most in need of immediate help. Hardly a day passed, as a matter of fact, that some readjustment did not have to be made in the distributing situation. In various crises the possibility of issuing a bread supply in certain regions for the following week depended entirely on these swift readjustments.

In order to keep in closest possible touch with the

situation in every part of the country, a daily sheet was kept at Brussels, showing in detail for each province the stocks on hand, rate of consumption, the date to which the province had sufficient food to last, and the last date when additional supplies should leave Rotterdam in order to arrive on time to make no break in the feeding. This statement for all the principal commodities was sent to Rotterdam weekly for their guidance in making shipments, and was followed by them as closely as possible.

The system was further complicated by a special importing programme of foodstuffs destined exclusively for the popular soup kitchens. As these "*soupes*" furnished the backbone for the system of feeding the destitute, it was imperative that they should be supplied first. A careful census of all people utilizing this form of public feeding was tabulated from month to month, and the available supplies divided from Rotterdam according to a percentage table based on these records. These cargoes were specially labelled and billed and had precedence over all other shipments.

The varying conditions in the provinces and the consequent many rearrangements necessary in our

"*soupes*" programme are best indicated by the fact that, while in January, 1917, 15 per cent. of the 396,023 people in the City of Antwerp were dependent on the public *soupes*, by April 15th the number had increased to 54 per cent. of the population, which required that three and one-half times as much food must be shipped to Antwerp for this special branch of the work in April as in January.

Just as Belgium's magnificent network of canals was of inestimable value to the Commission in its distribution of food supplies by canal boat, so the fact that Belgium has more miles of railroad in proportion to its area than any other country was equally helpful.

The Belgian railroads are of two types. The standard-gauge main trunk lines are owned and operated by the Government, and consequently passed over into the hands of the occupying authorities. Connecting practically every small village with the large centres are narrow-gauge steam roads that wander over the face of the level country as if they were following cattle trails. These roads are partly governmentally, partly municipally, and partly privately owned, and their management was but little inter-

fered with by the Germans until the spring of 1917, when they began to dismantle some of these roads, carrying the tracks and ties off to the front to build up the transport service behind the lines.

These narrow-gauge roads did much of the hauling for the Commission of supplies from the provincial or regional warehouses to the points of distribution, and as the main roads became more and more congested by movement of troops and army supplies, the importance of these smaller roads increased. The Dutch Government generously gave the Commission free railroad transport on all the Dutch railroads, and an agreement was reached with the German Government whereby only one-half the regular tariff should be paid by us for freight inside of the occupied territory.

Each winter we had feared that the canals and rivers of Belgium might freeze and thus shut off all traffic by waterways. Such a serious freezing had not occurred for fifteen years, but, to be safe, a careful plan was worked out in advance and negotiations carried on with the Dutch and German authorities for the supply of the necessary railroad cars should this event ever come to pass.

ALBERT N. CONNETT
Director in Brussels in February-April, 1915

CARL A. YOUNG
Director in Rotterdam from January, 1915, to June, 1916

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OSCAR T. CROSBY

Director in Brussels, May to September, 1915. Later Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and now member of the Inter-Allied Conference.

LINDON W. BATES

First Director in New York, November, 1914, to November, 1915

In February, 1917, our fears were realised. Every river and canal was blocked with ice, which gradually attained a metre in thickness, and defied all efforts of our ice breakers.

Our plan called for the despatch to Rotterdam from Belgium empty, and the return loaded, of two hundred German cars per day, beginning four days after the freeze-up, and the gradual increase of this number up to three hundred cars per day. This programme was never fully lived up to because of the movement at this time by the Germans of large supplies for their armies, in anticipation of the summer offensive, but our shipments from Rotterdam reached as high as 3,000 tons per day, and by them we were able to carry on the supplying of the country without serious interruption during all the forty days that navigation was closed.

The difficulties that had to be overcome were tremendous; breaking barges out of the ice in Rotterdam harbour so that they might come alongside the loading wharfs or elevators; keeping canals open in Belgium up to the last minute so that barges en route might get to the nearest unloading ports; checking, unloading and diverting railroad cars as

the needs required. All called for the hardest work imaginable, and a complete transformation overnight of the existing system based on shipments by water. All custom of the port of Rotterdam in the manner of loading cars was upset. The Dutch had never heard of loading wheat in bulk in cars, but sacking it was a slow process, and could not be tolerated. Therefore the cars were first made tight, which was a serious job, because the rolling-stock was in a badly run-down condition. It kept men working day and night. Some of the gear of the elevators had to be re-arranged so that the grain would run down the spouts into the cars at low tide. Basket cranes had to be rigged, and thirteen loading stations in the port of Rotterdam created.

To meet the changed conditions and permit the discharge of cars, the unloading gear of all the mills in Belgium had to be changed, and where this could not be done the wheat was ground in a central mill and the flour sent on to destination. Our transport and handling organisation, which had taken more than two years to build up, was disrupted and disorganised in a day. But only for a day, for out of a maritime organisation appeared in twenty-four hours

a railroad organisation, which daily increased its handling capacity up to 3,000 tons per day.

But no sooner was it created that we began to plan to turn it back again into the handling of canal boats and tugs, and when finally the thaw set in after six weeks of ice, and water transport was resumed again, we were prepared to pick up the canal boats where they had been frozen in, and to despatch newly loaded boats from Rotterdam.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

WHAT THE BELGIANS EAT

THE story of Belgium will never be told. That is the word that passes oftenest between us. No one will ever by word of mouth or in writing give it to others in its entirety, or even tell what he himself has seen and felt. The longer he stays the more he realises the futility of any such attempt; the more he becomes dumb."

My wife wrote these words in Brussels just a year ago as the first paragraph of an attempt to describe a single phase of the story of Belgium in martyrdom —the phase of the work, beautiful in its loyalty, its intelligence and its sacrifice, of the *"women of Belgium turning tragedy into triumph."

The words are literally true. My own feeling, in the face of my wish to make real to my readers the actual situation and the actual course of the relief work in Belgium during the past three years,

*Women of Belgium, by Charlotte Kellogg, 1917. Funk and Wagnalls Company. $1.00. All profits of the book go to The Commission for Relief in Belgium.

is one of helplessness—of despair. How I have held back from attempting this chapter about the details of the relief work inside Belgium, its organisation, its methods, above all its intimate relation to the Belgium people in all their misery and nobility! And I know now that it will be a chapter like the others before it, of dry facts and figures, of cataloguing but not revealing details of human suffering and human activity in an amazing emergency and an equally amazing effort to meet this emergency. The time I spent inside of Belgium between May, 1915 and March, 1917, is now all a dream; or is it the rest of life in a country of safety and comfort, among a generation of mankind that knows not war, that has been all a dream? Can there exist on the same earth, at the same world time in reality, the two kinds of human experience represented, one by the days and events of a Kansas village and a California college through the years of a generation, and another of Belgium through the months since August, 1914? One of these must be the long sweet sleep of childhood or the other the horror of a drug-created delirium. One or the other must be unreal.

In those first days of November and December,

1914, the requirements of the organisation of the work of the Commission in New York, London, Rotterdam and Brussels were serious and had to be met swiftly and effectively. To meet them Mr. Hoover called on engineer friends; Lindon Bates, as first director in New York; Millard Hunsiker and John B. White, as first directors in London; Capt. J. F. Lucey, first director in Rotterdam; and Dannie Heineman, first director in Brussels, were all engineers or men of engineering affairs, so that the Commission started work on a basis of "engineering efficiency." Its maintenance on that basis has undoubtedly been due to the successive incoming of other engineers to fill its active directorships.

New York's later directors have been J. B. White, J. F. Lucey and W. L. Honnold—all engineers. London's later directors have been Mr. Honnold and Wm. B. Poland—both engineers. Rotterdam's later directors have been C. A. Young and W. L. Brown—also both engineers. Only in the Brussels office have men other than engineers sat in the director's chair. And there have been twice as many men used to fill that chair as have been used

in any of the other head offices; the Brussels directorship wore out men's nerves. Following Mr. Heineman, Captain Lucey, who had thoroughly organised the Rotterdam office and work, was in charge in Brussels for a few months. He was followed by A. N. Connett, an engineer, and he in turn, by O. T. Crosby, another man of engineering affairs, now assistant secretary of the Treasury. I followed Mr. Crosby. It was the first break in the engineer's monopoly! After me came Wm. B. Poland another engineer and now director in London. After Mr. Poland the office was in my hands again for several months, and again following me came Warren Gregory, an attorney of San Francisco, and thus the second exception to the engineer character of the service. Finally, when Mr. Gregory left Brussels with all but seven of the Americans on March 31, he turned the director's office over for the last month of its occupation by an American, a month of great stress and difficulty, to Prentiss Gray, a Californian shipping man.

Under these successive directors—all of them in turn under the stimulus and inspiration and immediate supervision of the "Big Chief," Mr. Hoover—

the manifold details and relations of the relief work inside Belgium gradually unfolded. From the beginning this unfolding has gone hand in hand with the development of the many and widely inclusive activities of the great relief machinery of the native Belgian organisations headed by the Comité National with its most capable heads, Francqui, de Wouters, Janssens, Van Bree, and the rest.

But it would be very unfair to leave the impression that the initiating and working out of the myriad details of the relief work was exclusively or even chiefly due to the merit of the head offices of the American and Belgian organisations in Belgium. On the contrary, the credit for these details of control should go principally to the field men of the Commission, the few active young American delegates in the provinces, and to the many devoted Belgians of the provincial, regional, communal and special committees. It was these men—and women—who came constantly in immediate contact with the conditions and needs of the people, conditions and needs varying from region to region, and who determined on a basis of observation and experiment—the trial and error method of experimental scientists—the forms

taken by the relief work in its various phases. The coördination of all the variety of work and the various methods of accomplishing it, and the general organisation necessary to support it, were the functions of the head offices. But the actual work was done in the thousands of communes; the thousands of canteens and *soupes*, the hundreds of centres of the special charities, the scores of regional and provincial headquarters.

Next, probably, in difficulty and complexity to the problems of internal transportation referred to in our last chapter came the problems of flour making, baking and bread-rationing. In order that perfect control could be maintained over the supply of breadstuffs—the basis of the whole food ration—and a fair distribution of bread to rich and poor alike be accordingly insured, the entire business of milling and baking in Belgium was carried out under the immediate direction of the relief organisation. The amount of wheat to be milled was determined for each mill, and only that much grain was assigned it; the kind of flour to be made was determined, and finally its distribution to the bakers adjusted in detail.

No baker who baked bread from relief flour could use, or even have in his bake-shop, any other flour—there was always some smuggled in from Holland, and there was always German flour to be baked for the German officials and their casinos. Each baker was assigned so much flour; he had to produce from it so many loaves of a determined quality and weight, and he gave out these loaves only to certain listed canteen or communal depots or to a listed number of clients, each furnished with a personal or family bread-card, which allowed them to obtain at a fixed price a fixed amount of bread, determined by the number of persons dependent on them. If the customer was destitute he received the money or a ticket for his bread from the benevolent committee of his commune.

The baker's profit was precisely determined by the relief organisation, and for any infraction of the regulations governing him and his work he was haled before a "baker's court," wholly outside of any Belgian or German legality but presided over by members of the relief organisation. There he could be "warned," or flour withheld from him for a week, a fortnight, a month, or for all the rest of the time

of the relief work, according to the seriousness of his offence. Offences on the part of the customers—as, for example, attempted padding of their family list, or attempts to get on the rolls of more than one baker—were promptly made known by the neighbours and the proper corrections, or penalties, enforced. It was absolute control.

All the bread used in Belgium for the last three years has been war bread made of flour derived from wheat milled at 80% to 97% (changing with the varying need at different times of "stretching" the wheat), mixed with a varying percentage of flour made from other cereals, as rye, barley, corn, and rice. "Wheat milled at 80%" means that 80% of the wheat grains goes into the flour; the rest composes the "grain offal" (middlings, shorts, bran) and is used for animal feed. Our experience has shown that a whole population (except for a few invalids and weakly children) can be safely fed on bread made from wheat flour of from 80% to 85% milling, but that when coarser flour is used a part of the population cannot stand it. This has also been the experience of the other war-bread eating countries. Germany mills at 82%, England at 81%,

France at 85%, and only Italy at 90%. The milling percentage of American standard white flour is considerably lower than 80%; of the fancy patents much lower. The Belgian daily ration of this war-bread has averaged about twelve ounces, varying at times in accordance with the abundance or scarcity of the wheat available.

The other items of the daily relief ration were listed on a separate card. These were bacon (trifle over 1 oz.), lard (trifle over ⅔ oz.), rice (2⅛ oz.), dried beans and peas (1⅔ oz.), cerealine (1⅔ oz.), potatoes (10½ oz.), and brown sugar (trifle over ⅔ oz.). The ration of all of these together, with the addition of bread, which the relief organisation has tried to maintain, amounts to about 870 grams (30½ ounces) in weight. The protein content in it is about 45 grams and the fat content about 43 grams. It is capable of producing about 2,000 utilisable calories, which is nearly enough for an ordinary individual doing no work, but is hardly more than half enough for a man at work.

This ration, all of it except the potatoes composed of foodstuffs imported into Belgium by the Commission, cost about eight cents a day laid down in the

communal depots. It is a ration worked out very carefully to make money go as far and as effectively as possible in the providing of a scientifically balanced, readily transportable and storable and easily divisible food supply to a people whose whole eating could be controlled and directed. Many Belgians have lived on it almost exclusively for three long years.

But in the same breath it must be added that many Belgians have had more. All those who could afford it have bought certain native supplies, especially vegetables, fruit, milk, eggs, and some meat. On the other hand many have not been able, for lack of sufficient money from charity, to have all this ration. The hundreds of thousands of unemployed have found their little weekly allowance insufficient to allow them to purchase the whole ration. And the truly destitute, the millions of the soup and bread lines! What of them?—and the little children who need special food, above all milk? And the young mothers, the mothers-to-be, and the aged and ill? And at the other extreme, the strong miners in the coal mines that have to be worked if Belgium is not to freeze—and is to have light, and some mov-

ing trains and trams—what of these, whose ration is enough for a man resting but not more than half enough for a man at hard work? What happens here is that their wives give up part of their share that the men may have more. We have seen women fall fainting from hunger weakness in the miner's homes; they had given their food to the husband and children.

It is all this side of the picture that is indescribable. We have neither the brush nor the color to paint it. And yet it is the struggle and the incident of this phase of the work, of this personal contact and effort with misery; this heart-breaking, nerve-stretching race against death, that stand out in the memory of every Commission man who worked in Belgium. And it is what he saw, in connection with this, of fortitude and nobility, of self-sacrifice and untiring effort for others among the men and women of Belgium that makes his memory a glorious one despite the background of all the harrowing scenes of suffering and tragedy that he can never efface from the picture.

The most conspicuous revelation of the degree to which a great portion of the Belgian people is de-

pendent on charity for its daily bread is that afforded by the long "soup lines" visible in every hamlet and every section of every town and city in the land. Over a million and a half people were standing every day in these lines by the end of 1916. How many there are now, as time and events have gone on bringing with them increasing exhaustion of national and individual resources and a steady lessening in the monthly totals of imported food for distribution from the communal depots, I cannot say. In the province of the Hainaut alone the number jumped from 60,000 in February of 1917 to 400,000 at the time the last American delegates had to leave in May. In Antwerp the number increased in the first half of this year from one-third of the whole population to one-half of it. On the first of May in one of the Antwerp soup lines twelve persons fainted and fell from the line as they waited their turn. It is probable that every third man, woman and child in Belgium to-day depends for continued existence on the daily pint of soup and ten ounces of bread doled out in the soup lines.

One of our Commission representatives in the Province of Liége made a careful study in November

and December of last year of the actual economic and food conditions of a considerable number of working men's families. A few of these working men had full work; more had but partial work, while some were idle and wholly dependent on charity. He found the families of these men to average five to six persons and the weekly family income from work and charity to average 20.81 francs (about $4) being an average daily income per person of 53 centimes (10 cents). Of this income 72.7% was expended for food, 2.7% for rent, 7.2% for clothing, 6.5% for heat and light, and 10.9% for miscellaneous items. The food value averaged 1,500 calories per day per person. Taking the minimum number of calories per person per day necessary for those who are at rest to be 2,000 (or 2,250 as most physiologists hold), it will be seen that the individuals of these Liége families were actually living on a ration considerably less than the actual minimum need for safe bare existence when at rest. Yet some of the men are at work. That they can work at all means that the women and children are making sacrifices for the wage-earning husbands and fathers. The daily bill of fare for many of these families reads thus: Breakfast: bread with



WILLIAM L. HONNOLD

Director in London, October, 1915, to July, 1916; Director in New York from September, 1916, to present



VERNON KELLOGG

Assistant Director for Northern France, German Great Headquarters (Charleville) June to September, 1915: Director in Brussels September to November, 1915, and July to October, 1916; Director-at-large in America, London, and Brussels, November, 1916, to present. Also now on the staff of the U. S. Food Administration.

a little lard (for butter) and a hot drink made of roasted grain; dinner (at noon): soup and bread from the soup line for the father and mother, charity-school lunch for the children. Supper: rutabagas and some of the soup and bread saved from the noon meal.

But the long privation and semi-starvation are having their effect. The people exist: yes; but how many are wasting away? In the coal-mining regions of the Hainaut, about Mons and Charleroi, this is especially apparent. A certain mining company which looks closely after its employees and does its utmost for them has determined that the mortality among its thousands of men in the first trimester of 1917 was three and one-half times as great as the average for the same period during the preceding three years. The weight of all the workers—except the developing young men composing but 5% of the total—has decreased; among 35% of the men the reduction has been from ten to forty pounds each. Three times as many men are on the sick and disabled list as there were before. Everywhere over Belgium, and among all ages there is an alarming increase of tuberculosis. It is simply the expression

of the steadily weakening capacity to resist disease.

The Commission to-day is struggling harder than ever before to obtain and transport overseas and into Belgium the needed food. But the ever-increasing shortage of ships, coupled with the ever-increasing demands of the Allies and our own nation for these ships for military transports—the carriage of men, munitions and food, is making the "relief of Belgium" more and more difficult. The real relief that the Belgians and the civilized world are praying for is the early rescue of the Belgian land and people from German occupation. That alone will really save Belgium; and even that must not be too long delayed.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE SAVING OF THE CHILDREN

BUT in the meantime, and all the time, the work of caring for the Belgians must go on, and is going on. It is not limited to the general *ravitaillement* and the general *secours* of the soup lines which apply to the people, or to great groups of them, *en masse*. It takes also many special forms adapted to the many special needs. The babies and the aged; the young mothers and the women immediately expectant of motherhood; the "ashamed poor"; the churches and the priests and sisters; the farmers needing help to restore their wrecked buildings; the mutilated soldiers of the early war days; the distressed special groups, thrown out of opportunity to work; the artisans, artists, and professional men; the lace-workers; the soldier-prisoners in Germany, dependent for their very life on the special food packages regularly sent them; the women and girls in the great *ouvroirs*, where the old clothing from America, Canada, and England is

worked over; all these and other special needs are struggled with every hour of every day. And it is in this special work, the work of these special charities, that the Belgian resourcefulness, quiet persistent heroism, and self-sacrificing devotion have been exhibited in superlative degree.

But American help has done what it can for these special *œuvres* as well as for the general *ravitaillement* and *secours*. Side by side the Belgians and Americans have worked for the saving of the unfortunate. The Americans have offered all their resources of world charity, all their influence with the occupying authorities; the Belgians have offered their intimate knowledge of the condition and psychology of their own people, and given their brains and hands and their own charity as well, to an amount as yet incalculable.

Take the special care of the babies and children for example. Besides the carefully developed system of school lunches by which over a million Belgian children of school age are having their insufficient home feeding eked out by a daily simple meal in the schoolroom, the special children's canteens are giving food and—no less important—medical attention to over 200,000 infants under three years. In the

PRENTISS N. GRAY

Assistant Director in Brussels from June, 1916, to March, 1917, and Director in April, 1917. Later Assistant Director in London and now Assistant Director in New York.

WILLIAM B. POLAND

Assistant Director in Brussels, September to November, 1915, then Director, December, 1915, to June, 1916, and now Director in London.



WARREN GREGORY
Director in Brussels, November, 1916, to April, 1917

WALTER L. BROWN
Director in Rotterdam, July. 1916. to present

province of Liége alone there are 111 special charities for children faithfully looked after by 1,500 volunteer workers giving all their time day after day through the long months to the service of love and patriotism.

In Brussels the famous "Little Bees" are taking care of practically every child needing help in the whole great city. These "Little Bees" existed before the war as a benevolent organisation composed of the daughters of well-known Brussels families banded together to help poor children, especially those sub-normal in health or mentality. With the outbreak of war, mothers joined the daughters, funds were swiftly increased, canteens expanded in number, over a hundred well-known Brussels physicians added to the volunteer helping staff, and now the "Little Bees" mean the difference between life and death to tens of thousands of Belgium's rising generation.

Here is a swiftly drawn picture of a visit to one of the Little Bees' canteens. (Charlotte Kellogg, in "Women of Belgium.")

"On the second floor, between two large con-

necting rooms, I found Madame, in white, superintending the day's preparation of the tables for 1,662. That was the size of her family. Fourteen young women, with bees embroidered in the Belgian colors on their white caps, were flying to and fro from the kitchen to the long counters in the hallway piled with plates, then to the shelves against the walls of the dining room, where they deposited their hundreds of slices of bread and saucers for dessert. Some were hurrying the soup plates and the 1,662 white bowls along the tables, while others poured milk or went on with the bread-cutting. Several women were perspiring in the kitchens and vegetable rooms. The potato-peeling machine, the last proud acquisition which was saving them untold labour, had turned out the day's kilos of potatoes, which were already cooked with meat, carrots and green vegetables into a thick, savory stew. The big fifty-quart cans were being filled to be carried to the dining room; the dessert of boiled rice was getting its final stirring. Madame was darting about, watching every detail, assisting in every department.

"It was raining outside, but all was white, and clean, and inviting within. Suddenly there was a

rush of feet in the court-yard below. I looked out the window; in the rain, 1,662 children between three and fourteen years, mothers often leading the smaller ones—not an umbrella or rubber among them—were lining up with their cards, eager to be passed by the sergeant. These kind-hearted, long-suffering sergeants kept this wavering line in place, as the children noisily climbed the long stairway—calling, pushing. One little girl stepped out to put fresh flowers before the bust of the Queen. Boys and girls under six crowded into the first of the large, airy rooms, older girls into the second, while the bigger boys climbed to the floor above. With much chattering and shuffling of sabots they slid along the low benches to their places at the long, narrow tables. The women hurried between the wiggling rows, ladling out the hot, thick soup. The air was filled with cries of '*Beaucoup, mademoiselle, beaucoup!*' A few even said, 'Only a little, Mademoiselle.' Everybody said something. One tiny, golden-haired thing pleaded: 'You know I like the little pieces of meat best.' In no time they discovered that I was new, and tried slyly to induce me to give them extra slices of bread, or bowls of milk.

"In this multitude each was clamouring for individual attention, and for the most part getting it. Very little ones were being helped to feed themselves; second portions of soup were often given if asked for. Madame seemed to be everywhere at once, lifting one after another in her arms to get a better look at eyes or glands. Her husband, a physician of international reputation, was in the little clinic at the end of the hall, weighing and examining those whose turn it was to go to him that day. Later he came out and passed up and down the rows to get an impression of the general condition of this extraordinary family. When, for a moment, husband and wife stood together in the middle of the vast room, they seemed with infinite solicitude to be gathering all the 1,662 in their arms—their own boy is at the front. And all the time the 1,662 were rapidly devouring their bread and soup.

"Then began the cries of '*Dessert, mademoiselle, dessert!*' Tired arms carried the 1,662 soup plates to the kitchen, ladled out 1,662 portions of rice, and set them before eager rows. Such a final scraping of spoons, such fascinating play of voice and gesture. Then, the last crumb eaten, they crowded up to

offer sticky hands with '*Merci, mademoiselle,*' and '*Au Revoir.*' The clatter of sabots and laughter died away through the court-yard, and the hundreds started back to school.

"The strong American physician, who had helped ladle the soup, tried to swing his arm back in position. I looked at the women who had been doing this practically every day for seven hundred days. Madame was apparently not thinking of resting—only of the next day's ration.

"I discovered later that at four o'clock that afternoon she had charge of a canteen for 400 mothers and their new babies, and that, after that, she visited the family of a little boy who was absent, according to the children, because his shirt was being washed.

"All attempts to express admiration of this beautiful devotion are interrupted by the cry: 'Oh, but it is you—it is America—that is doing the astonishing thing; we *must* give ourselves, but you need not. Your gift to us is the finest expression of sympathy the world has known.' "

* * * * * *

There are nearly 50,000 lace-workers—women and

girls—in Belgium. Before the war they supported themselves, and some of their families also, by their work.

The Belgian laces have been long the pride of the country. The Queen had patronised the industry; famous artists vied with one another in devising beautiful patterns. The laces found their way all over the world.

Came the war. No more of the necessary fine thread could be brought in; no more lace could go out. Ruin faced the lace industry, starvation the lace-workers. The Belgian and American relief organisations exerted every effort to make some arrangement with the blockading and the occupying powers. A number of Belgium's noblest women gave their wits, their money and their whole hearts to an effort to help save the precious industry—and the more precious bodies and souls of the stranded girl workers. And Mrs. Whitlock—a woman finely representing America's best type of feminine development—capable, great-hearted, simply direct, devoted, and radiating love of home and humanity, threw herself into the struggle with all her energy and influence. Needless to say

she carried with her all her husband's official and unofficial aid.

The result of this struggle has been to effect an arrangement whereby over forty thousand of the lace-workers have been enabled to go on, in some degree, with their beautiful work. Each woman and girl can work two weeks out of every four. The Commission is made absolutely responsible to the Allied Governments for every bit of thread imported by it. For each pound of thread a pound of lace must be turned over by the lace-workers to the Commission to take out of the country. Sales are made in Paris, London, and New York. Part of the money may be remitted into Belgium to pay the wages of the lace-workers—who are thus kept from the soup lines, and worse; and part is kept in London for future payment when the war is over.

Another charity characterised equally by kindness of heart and good management is that known as the "*Assistance Discrète*" with its significant motto: *Donne, et tais-toi* (Give, and be silent). It looks after ten thousand or more of the "Ashamed Poor" of Brussels. It is not possible to put all of a proud people into soup lines. Some will starve in silence

first. And so a group of noble women, giving their own service and money and with the assistance of some funds that the relief organisation have assigned to them, has developed discreet methods of saving many of these *honteux pauvres* despite themselves. They are helped by means they do not understand —by persons they do not know.

A most effective special charity maintained exclusively by American aid is one that takes cognisance of "special cases." It is known as the "Forbes Fund," having been founded by Mrs. Cameron Forbes of Boston. One of the saddening things ever before the relief workers in Belgium is the inability to give particular help to individual cases needing special attention. Our system calls for an even distribution of the ration, but evenness in distribution is not always synonymous with wisest or most equitable distribution. There may be two war widows, each with three dependent children; one mother may be able to work and earn a little; the other may be ill, or her children may be ill. This family needs more help than the other; but the system which is devised primarily to effect an even distribution to millions has difficulty in adapting

Weak children (*enfants debiles*) being fed in a children's cantine in Brussels

A soup-line in Brussels

Photo by Paul Thompson

Celebration in a large food-distributing centre in St. Gilles, a suburb of Brussels

The great central clothing supply station in Brussels (formerly a music hall and circus)

itself to the special case. The Forbes Fund is a fund for special cases. It has been a godsend both to relief workers and to their wards. Its founder has been blessed and prayed for in Flemish and French by hundreds of sick mothers, and despairing husbands and fathers. Divided into little portions it has accomplished great results; it is one of the happiest inspirations in the way of special charity.

* * * * * * * *

But why catalogue the tears and the blessings? Why try to enumerate a few of the special charities where the list is so long? It is only that the reader may know that such special charities do exist; that the work of relief is not all simply that of a great commercial agency, a sublimated "grocery store," as some thoughtless critic has expressed it. The grocery store is there; but it is only one part of an organisation that uses brains and heart in no less measure than commercial acumen and efficiency. The people of Belgium do not know the Americans as grocers; they call them "saviours."

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

FEEDING NORTHERN FRANCE UNDER THE EYES OF THE GERMAN ARMY

FRANCE and its friends peer anxiously across the trench lines of the western front and wonder how it is going with Lille and Valenciennes, St. Quentin and Sedan, and all that hidden land lost for the moment to the sight of the Allied world. Held in the merciless grasp of the invader; ruled with the uncompromising rigour of an enemy army embittered by checks and mounting losses; with no friendly resident diplomats to inform themselves and the world outside of injustice, cruelty, and tragedy, the people of occupied France exist in silence and darkness. Do they even exist? And if so, how?

The Commission for Relief in Belgium should have been named the Commission for Relief in Belgium and Northern France, for one-quarter of its activities have been devoted to the importation, protection, and distribution of food and clothing in occupied

France, a region about twenty-one thousand square kilometres in area and including a population (since the invasion) of about two and a quarter million French civilians. These imprisoned French people are mostly women and children and old men. Almost every man of military age from this territory is in the French army. They had time and opportunity to answer the call to the colours before the steel ring was set about the land in September, 1914.

Of the present total population of the German-occupied territory of France, hereafter usually referred to as Northern France, more than half is included in the contiguous arrondissements of Lille, Valenciennes and Douai, in the Departement du Nord, small in area, but thickly populated by an industrial population depending always very largely on food supplies imported into that region. There are also other industrial centres in the occupied territory, notably the Longwy-Briey coal and iron-bearing region in the Departement de Meurthe et Moselle. Altogether, it is undoubtedly fair to consider the whole population of the occupied territory as about two-thirds industrial and one-third agricultural.

Having this fact in mind, and recognising the in-

evitable demands made on the resources of the region by an invading and occupying army of great size, and the serious situation of a population, largely industrial, cut off suddenly from all normal external sources of supply, it is easily understood that steps would have to be taken by local authorities and philanthropic persons very soon after the occupation to arrange for food distribution to the poor and to the workless people in the industrial districts. Such steps were, indeed, taken at once; local authorities and citizen committees set themselves actively to the task of obtaining possession of local food supplies and dealing them out economically and fairly. Fortunately the harvest was just about completed at the time of the occupation, and there was also a considerable stock of cattle and sheep in the farming regions. The town councils and local committees arranged to secure resources by the issuance of "*bons*," notes, etc., and by borrowing from the wealthier citizens. Then grain and local food stocks of groceries, clothing, etc., were purchased, mills commandeered, and an equalised distribution begun.

Despite the good results of all this beneficent activity, however, the time soon came when it was

obvious that the local food supply what with German requisitions and the needs of the people, was rapidly nearing exhaustion. Indeed, it is only surprising that the region was able to maintain itself for as long as it did without external aid. As a matter of fact, this need for outside help, and appeals for it, began to be sufficiently imperative in certain parts of the occupied territory by December, 1914, to attract the attention of the Commission, and in January, February and March, 1915, some supplies of flour, rice, dried beans and peas, bacon and condensed milk were sent to Givet, Fumay, Sedan, Charleville-Mezières and Longwy from its Belgian stocks. Maubeuge and the immediately surrounding region had already been attached to the Belgian Province of Hainaut for *ravitaillement* purposes.

It soon became apparent, however, that, instead of casual consignments from Belgium, an independent and systematically distributed continuous supply of food-staples would have to be arranged if the population of Northern France was to be spared serious and even dangerous suffering from lack of food. The Commission, therefore, began to arrange for this. With the aid of the American Ambassadors

in London and Berlin, and the State Department, negotiations were undertaken, and in time effected, with the Allied and the German Governments and the Great Headquarters at Charleville for the regular *ravitaillement* by the Commission of all of occupied France. Before these more general negotiations were completed certain assurances were given by the German General Government of Belgium to Minister Whitlock at Brussels, which made possible the beginning of a regular despatch of food to a limited region about Fumay and Givet which had been attached to Belgium by the German authorities for administrative purposes. So that by March, 1915, the Commission was sending food to about four hundred thousand persons in the occupied French territory.

By the end of this month arrangements were practically completed for caring for all of the occupied territory, although the formal working agreement between the Commission and the German military authorities at Great Headquarters was not signed until the middle of April. These arrangements provided for sufficient funds from outside French sources and the appointment of French

committees in all the villages—there are nearly two thousand communes in the occupied territory—and major French committees for the various regions and districts into which the territory was divided for military administrative purposes. These committees were to handle the details of the distribution under the inspection and with the collaboration of a small number of American representatives of the Commission, and I have no words capable of justly appraising the devoted and self-sacrificing labours of the many thousand members of these French volunteer groups. The Americans were to reside in various centres and have with them, for their protection and escort, certain specially assigned German officers able to speak French and English. These officers were to be present at all conferences between the Commission's representative and the French committees; in fact, they were to be with the young Americans at all times. The latter were to live in houses provided by the army (by requisition) for the escort officers, have their meals with them, and travel about with them over the territory by train and motor on tours of inspection. It was an enforced close companionship for the sake of the safety

of the Americans, and the assurance of the military authorities that we should do no spying or inciting of the French to uncomfortable behaviour.

In a conference held at the Great Headquarters on March 21, between Major-General Zoellner, representing the Supreme Command of the German Army in France, and Mr. A. N. Connett, at that time director of the Commission in Brussels, a telegram from Mr. Hoover, dated London, March 18, served as basis for an agreement in principle on the general provisions necessary for the arrangements, and on April 13 a formally signed agreement was entered into at Brussels between the German Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in France (represented by Major von Kessler, an officer of high capacity and integrity) and the Commission (represented by Messrs. Connett, the director just retiring, and O. T. Crosby [now Assistant Secretary of the Treasury] the incoming director, who alone signed). This all-important basic agreement is as follows:

AGREEMENT

Between the German Commander-in-Chief, represented by Major von Kessler, General Staff Officer, at the General Intendant des Feldheeres: and

The Commission for Relief in Belgium, represented by Mr. O. T. Crosby, acting for C. R. B. at Brussels (who alone will sign), and Mr. A. N. Connett.

1. The G. C. I. Ch. gives his consent for the C. R. B. to undertake the supply of the population of the occupied French territory with food stuffs.

2. The G. C. I. Ch. gives the assurance that the goods imported for the said purposes will never be called upon for the use of the German army, but shall be used solely for the French population of the occupied territory. The G. C. I. Ch. will issue strict orders to all the respective subordinate authorities to the effect that these goods must never be seized. Any goods which may not have been distributed at any time will remain at the exclusive disposal of the C. R. B.

3. The C. R. B. is authorized to appoint in the occupied territory of Northern France American citizens as its delegates, who may, subject to the supplementary agreement No. 1, attached hereto, satisfy themselves of the carrying out of the assurance given under par. 2.

4. The requests to the C. R. B. for the distribution of the goods will be effected according to the determination of the C. R. B. in conjunction with the German Military authorities, by French trustees, who are to be nominated by the French communities, subject to the approval of the German Military authorities and of the C. R. B. These trustees will represent the French committees in the transactions with the delegates of the C. R. B., more particularly in connection with accounts and payments.

5. The G. C. I. Ch. will afford every facility for the carriage of the goods to the place of destination. The goods will be admitted free of duty, and freight will be

charged according to similar principles as may, from time to time, be in force for the supply of Belgium. The transport is regulated by the supplementary agreement No. 2 attached hereto.

6. In order to eliminate doubts as to the origin and destination of goods supplied, all means of transport and storing rooms will be labelled officially by the German Military authorities in such a manner as to make the goods recognisable as those covered by the regulations of par. 2.

7. If military exigencies should so require, this agreement may be cancelled by the G. C. I. Ch. at any time, without giving any reasons, by a notice to that effect to the C. R. B. However, all goods imported by the C. R. B. then being already within the occupied French territory shall be disposed of in accordance with the stipulation of this agreement, the American delegates remaining long enough to discharge their duties with respect to such goods, in so far as this is considered practicable for military reasons.

8. The right of the German Military authorities to requisition for military purposes against "*bons*" the food stuffs for men or animals still existing in the country is in no way affected by this agreement.

Likewise the German Military authorities reserve to themselves all rights in respect to the new crop.

(s.) VON KESSLER, MAJOR

Brussels, April 13th, 1915. (s.) O. T. CROSBY.

At the same time of the signing of the basic agreement, the two supplementary agreements referred

to were formulated and signed. One of these determined the conditions of the transportation of the food supplies through the occupied territory of Belgium as well as France—for all the foodstuffs had to be brought to Northern France from Rotterdam through Belgium. The other, and more interesting one, concerned the position of the Commission representatives in the occupied French territory.

The more important points in the transportation agreement provided for the free use of such canals as could be used, and a half freight tariff on the railways. The loaded canal boats and the railway cars were to be sealed at Rotterdam, or at Belgian points, as Brussels and elsewhere from which shipments were made into France, and delivered, sealed, at destination. They were also to be placarded to show that their contents were the property of the Commission, and the waybills were to contain an attestation that the goods were destined for the French civilian population.

The second supplementary agreement provided that the Commission's representatives should be able to assure themselves that the food supplies were being used exclusively in accordance with the guar-

antees given, i. e., were not being taken at all by the Germans. This meant that each representative must have a certain freedom of movement (in company with his officer), within his district; which movement should be restricted only by special military conditions and necessities. Our slogan was: the American must follow the food.

The agreement also provided that the French-occupied territory was to be divided into six distribution districts, at a centre in each of which two Americans and a German escort officer were to be stationed, with an additional chief representative and chief escort officer at Great Headquarters. As a matter of fact, most of the time, we kept but one American in each district centre. The Commission's representative for the Lille district was not allowed to live in Lille, but was stationed at Valenciennes where he and his officer lived with the representative for Valenciennes district and his officer.

By the agreement the Commission's representatives were entitled to receive free of charge, quarters, officer's rations, suitable attendance and military motor car for the use of themselves and escort officers. These motor cars were maintained even

Paper money issued by Belgian and French communes for local circulation

Group of Americans and German officers at Great Headquarters; the Americans are, from left: J. B. White, Vernon Kellogg, Herbert Hoover, Philip Chadbourn.

The house at Great Headquarters at Charleville in which the Commission's representatives lived with their German escort officers.

after the cars of higher officers had to be discontinued, because of lack of tires, oil and gasoline in Germany. Each American had a special passport which entitled him to move about in his district, and to go and come between Brussels and his centre. He had a railway pass; his necessary official correspondence, censored by his officer, and telephoning and telegraphing over the military wires, through the medium of his officer, were not charged for. Even though the passports were limited to the particular districts, any representative could go into other districts if his officer was willing to take him, so a certain amount of visiting from district to district was done, and occasional gatherings for conference of all the representatives and escort officers at Great Headquarters were held. Each American, on assuming his position as Commission representative in Northern France "takes upon himself the obligation to carry out his duties in such a manner as may be expected from an honourable citizen of a neutral state."

It is gratifying to be able to say that in the whole history of the stay of the Commission's men in Northern France, during which at least thirty differ-

ent men were used, no single complaint of dishonourable or unneutral conduct on their part was made by the German military authorities. Some of the escort officers occasionally had complaints to make of the immaturity of some of the Americans, or of their manner, not sufficiently stiff or precise properly to impress other German officers dining with them, and one complained rather bitterly—I remember, to my amazement—that his American persisted in wearing a ragged overcoat! But despite the strain of sympathy and anger imposed on them by being compelled to see the sufferings of the helpless French under the rigours of military control, and, too often, military brutality our men held their strong feelings in check. They were not only bound in honour, but they knew that their mission could be accomplished only by the maintenance of a correct behaviour; they could help the imprisoned people much more by limiting themselves to the all-important work of the *ravitaillement* than by giving way to any temptation, however strong, of unneutral acts or speech.

The personal work and experiences of the Commission's representatives in Northern France were very

different from those of the workers in Belgium. Belgium, except West Flanders and part of East Flanders, is administered by the Germans by a quasi-civil government with, to be sure, a strong military flavour, but Northern France from the first has always been under the direct and sole control of the German army, or, perhaps it would be better to say "armies," as each of the half dozen armies occupying the territory exercises a considerable autonomy in the region occupied by it. All these armies, and hence the whole territory, were, however, under the final control of the Great Headquarters. It was the distinctness of these armies and the occupation by each of a specific part of the occupied territory that determined the limits of the half dozen *ravitaillement* districts. The rigours of the military rule varied somewhat with the different armies, the Bavarians occupying Lille and vicinity, under Prince Rupprecht, being, in curious contradiction to the popular notions about Bavarians, the most rigorous and brutal in their treatment of the civil population.

This military rigour and the fact that each of the districts extended westward to the very trench lines, greatly restricted the freedom of the Commission's

representatives both in movement and personal relations with the civil population. It was understood that no American could hold conversation with any French civilian except in the presence of his escort officer. However, this was not always enforced in cases where the American had lived long enough with his officer to establish a feeling of confidence and trust in his honour. On the other hand one or two of the officers were very rigorous about this, and always promptly interrupted any conversation that seemed to be straying in the least from subjects strictly related to the food relief. And these poor shut-in people did so much want to talk a little about other things! Also, with each recrudescence of military operations here or there along the front, the American was carefully kept away from the villages near that particular part of the front, or was even occasionally held so closely to his centre that he could not even go to Brussels for the weekly meetings of all the Commission workers. Our representative at St. Quentin was once kept away from Brussels for seven weeks.

On the other hand, the necessary close acquaintanceship of each American and his escort officer;

the mutual participation in seeing and hearing the woes of the population; and the fact that no man, not even the most militaristic German—and our officers were not the most militaristic of Germans —could have anything to do with the relief work without getting deeply interested in it and being gripped by it, gave our Northern France men a certain advantage in having a friend at court in their necessary dealings with the army heads of their respective districts.

I remember hearing in Brussels one of the escort officers—these officers often accompanied their American charges to Brussels—complaining, partly quizzically, but more in bitter earnest, that his brother officers and the army commanders in his district had begun to suspect him of being pro-French, because he had always to be backing up his American in his struggling for the amelioration of the sad lot of the civil population.

There were adventures and incidents, too, in the experience of all our men in this district. French and English flyers were always bombing railway stations behind the lines. One of these casual bombs dropped on one of our regional depots and blew sev-

eral tons of good food into nothingness. The St. Quentin representative especially saw and heard war at close quarters.

But for the most part it was not danger, but irritation and indignation, that wore on these men of ours. Especially during the deportations from Lille in April, 1916, of men and women, boys and girls, torn without warning or farewells from their homes or picked up on the streets by squads of brutal Bavarian soldiery, was it hard for Commission men to keep silent. As a matter of fact, it was impossible; and, headed by the director himself, Mr. Poland, the Commission protested. It was just at the moment of Ambassador Gerard's visit to the Great Headquarters, and a general meeting of Commission representatives and escort officers had been arranged to meet him there. The meeting was also attended by some of the principal officers of the Headquarters and the matter was dropped like a bombshell into the midst of the conference. The Germans never forgave the Commission for that incident, but the happy result was an interruption in the brutal performance.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE GREAT HEADQUARTERS AND THE NORTHERN FRANCE RATIONS

THE Great Headquarters was a place of extraordinary interest. It was in the plain little gray town of Charleville on the Meuse, just where the river gives up its swift and winding course through the beautiful Ardennes to run out more sedately into the broad lower valley. The principal buildings and residences of the town had been requisitioned for the offices and residences for the thousand and more staff officers of the various army departments. The Kaiser, when he came, lived in a house in a large garden near the railway station, but later, because of the danger from the bombs aimed at the station by French flyers, used a villa on the outskirts of the town.

It was a place of quietness, much quieter than any ordinary lesser headquarters of any of the separate armies. But it always seemed to me an oppressive and significant quietness, as of some re-

strained but ever-growing terrible pressure ready to break at any moment into a huge roar and storm. And that was true of it, only the cataclysm when it came would occur farther to the west, somewhere along those fatal lines of malevolent activity. For several months I lived as the Commission's chief representative for Northern France among these grey-uniformed officers, who busied themselves assiduously all day in their plain offices with maps and despatches, with telephones and telegraphs tying them to every part of the various fronts, east as well as west, playing on little tables the great game of war and destruction and death. At night they would dine and drink their requisitioned French wines, and then they would talk and debate anything from music and poetry to German militarism and American munitions-sending. They rather liked explaining to the listening American the secret of German greatness, which is, simply, autocratic government from the top, based on military organisation. And they would point out vigorously the hopeless future of a country, even of great material resources, that perversely and stupidly persists in trying to govern itself by democracy, that is, from the bottom.

But whatever the fascinating interest or the wearing strain of life at Headquarters, or the adventures and excitement and anger-breeding days of living in a theatre of war and a sad land of war's destruction and human misery, there was just one thing that was always *the* thing in our life; the *ravitaillement.* As in Belgium, and even more importantly than in Belgium, the importation of the daily bread of the people simply had to be assured. For Northern France was not only sustaining the weight of an occupying army, but of a great active army as well, and we were unable to make any such satisfactory arrangements as were effected in Belgium for saving native crops for the civil population.

However, we did succeed by constant efforts at Headquarters in arranging to have part of the local grain and potato crops so reserved. It should be recalled that the last paragraph in the basic agreement of April, 1915, between the German Commander-in-Chief and the Commission, expressly reserved to the Germans "all rights in respect to the new crop." That is, the Germans reserved the right to take all of this crop for the use of the army, or to send it back to Germany to help feed their civilian

population. Under pressure, however, from the Commission, it was agreed in July that "beginning with September 11, 1915, at the latest, there is to be put at the disposal of the population of the occupied French territory from the crop produced in the country, per capita and per day, according to the wish of the commune, not more than 100 grams of flour" (about three and a half ounces). This was agreed to by the Germans only on the understanding that the Commission would provide 150 grams (a little more than five ounces) of imported flour per capita per day. This flour ration of 250 grams was equivalent to 345 grams (12⅓ ounces) of bread daily for each person and, as the German agreement ran, "in consideration of the lack of foods of other kinds, this amount is not to be considered too great." This was by way of explanation to the civil population in Germany, then living on 250 grams of bread a day.

By a later agreement (September 3rd) it was arranged also that the Germans would assign out of the native crop 200 grams of potatoes per person per day to the French civil population. All the rest of the native crops, except the produce of small house-

gardens, orchards and barnyards, was at the disposal of the German army.

In the early summer of 1916, the Commission took up with the Great Headquarters the matter of the disposition of the 1916 crop and was able to come to a better arrangement. An agreement signed in Brussels on August 26th, by Major von Kessler, representing the General Staff, and myself representing the Commission—after long debating and negotiation by the Commission both with the Allied Governments and the General Staff, with a final reference to Berlin—doubled the amounts of flour and potatoes which the German authorities agreed to turn over to the civil population. But the struggle over the matter was so serious that it became a grave question at one time whether the relief work would be permitted to continue at all. It was an extremely trying experience for us, with the very lives of the helpless French citizens as stakes in the game.

Unfortunately the local potato crop turned out to be so poor that there were not enough potatoes to provide 400 grams per person per day; in fact the people got a pitifully meagre supply out of the

1916 crop. The Germans, also, claiming a poorer grain crop than expected reduced the daily 200 grams of flour to 150 grams. The arrangements for the 1917 crop, effected by the Spanish-Dutch neutral committee which succeeded the Americans within the occupied territory have been made less favorable to the civil population. This is explained by the Germans as due to the very poor crops for the year.

This brings us now to a consideration of just what food, altogether, what kinds and what quantities, the imprisoned people of Northern France have had to eat during the last three years. The definite knowledge of just how much flour and potatoes of the native crops were available to the civil population, and the equally definite knowledge of how small were the food quantities available from orchards, vegetable gardens and barnyards in this stripped land, placed the Commission in a position where it could know, with near approach to exactness, just how much and what kinds of food had to be provided by it to keep the people alive. It was possible, in a word, to institute a precise ration for Northern France, which was something that could only be approached in Belgium.

The determination of just what kinds, and what amounts of each kind, of food should be imported was made on the basis of several factors, such as the amount of money and number of ships available and the most economical use of these funds and ships; it depended also on what permission for such imports was obtainable from the Allied Governments which quite properly maintained a close scrutiny and control on this carrying of food, especially fats, into a region so entirely in the hands of the active German army. And finally, the determination took into account the scientific knowledge of how money and food can go farthest to establish a properly balanced daily ration, just sufficient to maintain a people in life and comparative health. However, to do this, taste, convenience, and simplicity of preparation, and the traditional food habits of the people had to be taken into consideration, as well as the proper proportions of protein, fats, and carbohydrates, necessary to produce a minimum total number of calories (energy units) and minimum amount of tissue-building material.

The ration necessarily varied with the changing circumstances of purchase and importation; it varied

in amount, it varied as to its component parts, but on the whole it has been sufficiently uniform to allow a statement of its average make-up to indicate fairly what the people of Northern France have had for daily diet for three years.

The average daily ration provided by the Commission has been as follows: bread, 190 grams (trifle under 7 ounces); dried peas and beans, 30 grams (trifle over 1 ounce); rice, 61 grams (2+ ounces); bacon and lard, 49 grams (1¾ ounces); coffee, 16 grams (⅘ ounce); condensed milk, 25 grams (a little less than 1 ounce); sugar, 20 grams (⅘ ounce); maize products, 20 grams (⅘ ounce); dried fish, 15 grams (trifle over ½ ounce); biscuits—for children and the infirm—24 grams (⅘ ounce); very small quantities, irregularly, of cocoa (for children and the sick); cheese, *torrealine* (a roasted grain substitute for coffee), salad oil, chicory, vinegar and pepper. Salt was mostly obtained from Germany. A single small consignment of fresh meat, 1,000 sheep, was made from Holland in the fall of 1916, and a few larger ones have been made since.

In addition, this ration was increased by whatever portion the people really have had of the

promised German ration of flour (wheat, rye, and other things—often very bad, indeed—mixed) and potatoes. The flour ration they have, for the most part, had; the potato ration has been very irregular and far below the amounts agreed on. It must be said in justice to the Germans that their reasons for not living up to the agreement as to potatoes, is valid to the extent that the crop really was poor.

It will be asked how the people have been able to live, and keep well on such a meagre and monotonous diet—a diet that has yielded them a total of energy-units whose aggregate is markedly below that asserted by physiologists as being the minimum necessary for human beings under normal conditions, and a protein, or tissue-building component lower than any estimates of the necessary minimum, except those of a few radical modern physiologists. The answer is that not all of the people have been able to do it, although, up to the time of the beginning of the unrestricted submarine warfare (February, 1917), most of them had. Since then the general world shortage of food, the difficulties and interruption of overseas transportation, and the actual loss of several of our cargoes by torpedoes

and mines, have made it impossible for us to import sufficient foodstuffs to maintain even the small ration first described, and the resulting marked increase of illness and deaths among the weaker and the older—and to a less extent among the children (the children have always been first looked after both in Belgium and Northern France)—shows that the Northern France ration was really the irreducible minimum consistent with safety.

There has been a notable increase of tuberculosis, due to the rapid development of incipient cases, because of under-nutrition, and a markedly lower resistance to other disease, all over occupied France. Even before this last disastrous period, there had been noted a marked falling off in weight among all classes of the population, but up—or rather, down—to a certain point, this loss of weight was not accompanied by any evidence of impaired health. Indeed, for the first two years, or nearly that, the health of the people was, if anything, bettered by their enforced simple diet.

But now they are beginning to go to pieces. The birth-rate in the crowded Lille district has decreased by nearly 50 per cent. and the death-rate has in-

creased also by nearly 50 per cent. Among the older men and women the death-rate has doubled. The Commission is straining every effort to increase its importations, but shortage of tonnage and the high rates of transportation and of cost of food, are serious handicaps to its work. The obvious and only real relief of occupied France is that present great object of the Allies and America, the early expulsion, from every foot of its soil, of the heartless invader. May "The Day" come soon!

Until then, the magnificent spirit, the moral courage, and the physical bravery of this imprisoned people, existing under conditions of mental and physical suffering literally indescribable, must continue to be the admiration and inspiration of the civilized nations. France is to-day the torch before the world.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

BELGIAN RELIEF TO-DAY

THE impression is widespread that the American part in the relief of Belgium and Northern France ceased with the entrance of our country into the war. This impression is wholly erroneous. The work of the American Commission for Relief in Belgium is going on as importantly and as persistently as ever, with, however, one notable difference. There are, of course, no Americans within Belgium and France to receive and protect the imported food and control its disposition. That part of the work is being performed by Spanish and Dutch neutrals, organised as a special committee for that purpose and working under the patronage, advice, and protection of the Spanish and Dutch Ministers in Brussels, Marqués de Villalobar and Mynheer von Vollenhoven. All the German guarantees for the protection of the food originally given to the C. R. B. and its protecting and patron Ministers have been re-confirmed to the present

Dutch committee and its protecting Ministers, and the work inside the occupied territories—both in relation to the Belgian and French committees and all of the people, and to the German Government of Belgium and the German Military Control of Northern France—is going on exactly as when the neutral relief workers inside the occupied territory were Americans instead of Spanish and Dutch.

But outside of those territories the whole work still remains in the hands of the American Commission. Its Rotterdam, London, and New York offices and staffs are intact; Mr. Hoover is still its active head; it is buying the food in the markets of the world, chartering its ships and sending them to Rotterdam under its flag and under the same guarantees of safety on the high seas as before. It transships the cargoes at Rotterdam from the overseas ships into the canal boats, and starts them off for Belgium and Northern France. Only when they reach the borders and pass into the occupied territory do they pass from the control of the American Commission into that of the Hispano-Dutch Committee.

In one feature of the outside work also, there is a

difference from the situation as it existed before we entered the war. It is not an important feature from one point of view, although very important from another, but it is one which has had, as a corollary, the interruption by the Commission of its energetic nation-wide propaganda for charity, and hence has withdrawn, to a large extent, the activities of the Commission from before the public eye. Instead of deriving its special subsidies from Great Britain and France as before, the Commission now receives a regular monthly subsidy from the French and the Belgian Governments, which subsidies are in turn derived from loans made by the United States to these governments. The sums thus received monthly are $7,500,000 on account of the Belgian work and $5,000,000 on account of the work in occupied France. These sums, although less in total than was being spent before the commencement of the unrestricted submarine warfare, in February of this year, have yet been sufficient to pay for all the food for which the Commission has been able to find cargo space in the face of the swiftly decreasing availability of ships for its work. Under these conditions, therefore, the Com-

mission has not felt justified in calling on the charity of the world for additional money with which to purchase any food that has to be transported overseas.

On the other hand, the very lessening of the opportunity to use money beyond that provided by the loan of this Government, has created a situation within the occupied territories that makes even more urgent the rendering of assistance to many of the special local charities that can use funds within the country for the purchase of local supplies, the payment for labour and building, and the sending of large numbers of weak children to Holland for longer or shorter periods of recuperation. So that a number of the State and local American Committees have continued their devoted efforts to help in these ways, and their charity has done inestimable good.

It is needless to say that the world shortage of food and shipping has made very much more difficult the work of the Commission in its attempts to maintain a sufficient and regular supply of food from overseas. It has, indeed, been such a handicap that ever since last spring it has been impos-

sible for the Commission to maintain the figures of its former regular programme of importations, and the food supply of the unfortunate people within the occupied territories has been materially less during this last year than in either of the previous two years of the enemy occupation. Consequently the ration, already put at what seemed the minimum of safety, has had to be cut, with the inevitable result of an increased suffering. The suffering has revealed itself in the concrete way of a marked increase of illness and deaths.

But the relief of Belgium and France is still going on and the American Commission is as much a part of it as ever, except for the actual presence of Americans inside the occupied territories. And the relief work must go on as long as the war lasts, or, at least, as long as the present conditions of encirclement and isolation of Belgium and Northern France continue. What the Belgians pray for, what they maintain so bravely and nobly their marvellous spirit for, and what the whole world hopes for and a large part of it is fighting for, is that real relief of Belgium which will come only with the driving off from its sacred soil of every grey-coated invader now on it.

When that time comes, and not till then, can the whole story of fighting starvation in Belgium and Northern France be told. And it will be such a story of heroism opposing brutality, of spirit persistent in the face of bodily suffering and mental anguish, of the higher humanness in struggle with the lower, that the world emerging from the hideous maelstrom of a final war that marks the end, let us earnestly pray, of all war, will count the experience of Belgium as one of those parts of the terrible trial not entirely without its compensations. The Story of Belgium in the Great War is as truly destined to be as familiar to future generations in their look to history for encouragement and inspiration in the belief that man is more than animal, as it is destined to be familiar to pessimistic searchers for evidences of the persistence of brute instinct in man.

LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM

WHO HAVE SERVED AS VOLUNTEERS IN BELGIUM AND NORTH FRANCE, OR IN THE NEW YORK, LONDON AND ROTTERDAM OFFICES (AS ISSUED IN NOVEMBER, 1917, BY THE LONDON OFFICE). NO LIST OF THE MANY THOUSANDS OF DEVOTED VOLUNTEER WORKERS ENGAGED IN THE COLLECTION OF MONEY AND GOODS ALL OVER THE WORLD, ESPECIALLY IN AMERICA AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE, IS YET AVAILABLE

(Work began in London, Belgium and Rotterdam, October, 1914; in New York, November, 1914; and in Northern France, April, 1915; American representatives were withdrawn from Belgium and Northern France in April, 1917; B.F. indicates service in Belgium or France; the omission of the second date means that the member is still, November, 1917, in service)

MEMBER.	UNIVERSITY.	PERIOD OF SERVICE.	PERMANENT HOME OR BUSINESS ADDRESS.
ALLEN, BEN S.	....Stanford	October, 1914–	Associated Press, New York City.
AMES, W. C.		July, 1916–	Oakville, Napa County, Cal.
ANGELL, FRANK	B.F.Vermont and Leipsig	January–August, 1916.	Bryant Street, Palo Alto, Cal.
ARROWSMITH, ROBERT	B.F.Columbia and Berlin	Dec., 1915, to withdrawal.	253 Highland Avenue, Orange, N. J.
BAIN, H. FOSTER	B.F.Chicago	June, 1915–Sept., 1916.	c/o Mining Magazine, Salisbury House, E.C.
BAKER, GEORGE B.		October, 1915–	375 Park Avenue, New York City.
BARROWS, DAVID P.	B.F.California and Chicago	January–March, 1916.	2600 Etna Street, Berkeley, Cal.
BARRY, GRIFFIN R.	B.F.Stanford	Aug., 1915–Dec., 1916.	c/o G. A. Barry, Monrovia, Cal.
BATES, LINDON W.	....Yale	Nov., 1914–Oct., 1915.	615 Fifth Avenue, New York City.
*BATES, LINDON W., JR.	....Yale	Nov., 1914–May, 1915.	
BELL, JARVIS E.	B.F.	Oct., 1914–Jan., 1915.	
BELROSE, LOUIS	B.F.Georgetown	June–August, 1916.	6 Dupont Circle, Washington, D. C.
BERTRON, S. READING	....Yale	November, 1915.	40 Wall Street, New York City.
BOWDEN, CARLTON G.	B.F.Sewanee and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Jan., 1916, June–October, 1916.	St. Louis, Mo.
BRACKETT, FRANK P.	B.F.Dartmouth	July–December, 1916.	Pomona College, Claremont, Cal.
BRADFORD, HENRY P.	B.F.	January–May, 1916.	c/o Brown, Shipley & Co., London.
BRANSCOMB, BENNETT H.	B.F.Alabama and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Feb., 1915.	Goodwater, Alabama.
*BRODRICK, C. T.		Dec., 1914–Jan., 1915.	
BROWN, MILTON M.	B.F.Princeton	Feb., 1916–August, 1917.	Glendale, Cincinnati, Ohio.
BROWN, W. LYMAN	....California	December, 1916–	C. R. B., Rotterdam.
BRYANT, FLOYD S.	B.F.Nevada and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Jan., 1915.	Reno, Nevada.
†BULLE, GERMAN	B.F.	Beginning to Dec., 1916.	
CARMICHAEL, OLIVER C.	B.F.Alabama and Oxford	Dec., 1914–April, 1915.	Goodwater, Alabama.
CARSTAIRS, CHAS. HASELTINE.	B.F.Yale and Ecole des Sciences Politiques	Jan., 1915, to withdrawal.	Mariemont, Belgium.
CHADBOURN, PHILIP H.	B.F.Minnesota	Feb. to Dec., 1915.	223 East 17th Street, New York City.

Member.	University.	Period of Service.	Permanent Home or Business Address.
Chadbourn, William H.	B.F.Cornell	March–July, 1915.	223 East 17th Street, New York City.
Chamberlain, D. C.		November, 1914–	Des Moines, Iowa.
Chasseaud, H. Gordon	B.F.Amherst	Feb.–August, 1915.	c/o National City Bank, 55 Wall Street, New York.
Chatfield, Frederick H.	B.F.Harvard	Jan.–August, 1916.	1939 Madison Road, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Chew, Oswald	B.F.Harvard	Feb.–June, 1916.	1715 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa.
Clark, Archibald D.	B.F.Cambourne School of Music	Dec., 1914–Dec., 1915.	Utah Copper Co., Bingham Canyon, Utah.
Clark, Arthur W.	B.F.Meadville Theological School	Dec., 1915–April, 1916.	c/o General Electric Co., Schenectady, N. Y.
Clark, Stanley	B.F.	Dec., 1914–Dec., 1915.	Utah Copper Co., Bingham Canyon, Utah.
Clason, Charles R.	B.F.Maine and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Jan., 1915.	Gardiner, Maine.
Coffin, C. A.		November, 1915–	c/o General Electric Co., 120 Broadway, N. Y.
Connett, Albert N.	B.F.Rennselaer Polytechnic (Troy, N. Y.)	Feb.–April, 1915.	c/o J. G. White & Co., 43 Exchange Place, N.Y.
Connett, T. O.	B.F.Harvard Law and Cambridge	January–April, 1915.	c/o J. G. White & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N. Y.
Crocker, W. H.	....California	November, 1914–	First National Bank, San Francisco, Cal.
Croll, W. Morris	B.F.Princeton	June–Sept., 1915.	Princeton, N. J.
Crosby, Oscar T.	B.F.West Point	May–Sept., 1915.	Warrenton, Va.
Curtis, Edward D.	B.F.Harvard and Cambridge	Beginning to withdrawal.	Hammond Street, Chestnut Hill, Boston.
Cutler, Henry F.	B.F.Amherst, Genoa and Berlin	August, 1916–Jan., 1917.	Mount Hermon, Mass.
Cutting, R. Fulton	....Columbia	November, 1915–	320 Nassau Street, New York City.
Dana, Paul	B.F.Harvard	April–June, 1915.	1 Fifth Avenue, New York City.
Dangelfield, James, Jr.	B.F.	Dec., 1914, to withdrawal.	36 Garden Place, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Dawson, Thomas B.	B.F.	June–August, 1915.	Box 287, Providence, R. I.
Dickson, J. W.		Nov., 1914–Dec., 1914.	6 Haymarket, London, S. W. 1.
Dunn, Harry L.	B.F.California and Columbia Law School	July, 1916, to withdrawal.	c/o Mrs. E. P. Dunn, Arlington Hotel, Santa Barbara, Cal.
Dunn, William McKee	B.F.Yale	February–June, 1916.	118 Mutual Building, Richmond, Va.
Dutton, Robert M.	B.F.U. S. Naval Academy	April, 1915–Nov., 1916.	Insurance Exchange Bldg., San Francisco, Cal.
Dyer, Richard T.	B.F.Princeton	Dec., 1916–Feb., 1917.	62 Prospect Street, East Orange, N. J.
Eckstein, Frederick	B.F.Yale	Feb.–Aug., 1916, Nov., 1916, to withdrawal.	25 East 30th Street, New York City.
Edgar, William C.		November, 1914–	The Northwestern Miller, Minneapolis, Minn.
Fleming, J. H.	B.F.	Jan., 1915–Feb., 1916.	66 Pingree Avenue, Detroit, Mich.
Fletcher, Alfred C. B.	B.F.California and Gen. Theological Seminary	February, 1916–	410 Hearst Building, San Francisco, Cal.

Member.	University.	Period of Service.	Permanent Home or Business Address.
Fletcher, Horace	B.F.Dartmouth (Hon. A.M.)	Feb.–Nov., 1915.	Lotos Club, New York City.
Flint, William W., Jr.	B.F.New Hampshire and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Jan., 1915.	Balliol College, Oxford.
Gade, John A.	B.F.Harvard	Sept., 1916–Jan., 1917.	107 East 71st Street, New York.
Gailor, Frank H.	B.F.Sewanee and Oxford	Dec., 1914–July, 1915.	Memphis, Tennessee.
Galpin, Perrin C.	B.F.Yale and Oxford	Dec., 1914–May, 1915.	New Haven, Conn.
Gary, Elbert H.	....Wheaton and Chicago	November, 1915–	71 Broadway, New York.
Gay, George Inness	....Colorado	July, 1916–	434 S. 2nd Avenue, Mt. Vernon, N. Y.
Gerard, James W.	....Columbia	Oct., 1914–Feb., 1917.	Union Club, 1 East 51st Street, New York.
Gibson, Carleton B.	B.F.Illinois	Dec., 1914–April, 1915.	208 Bull Street, Savannah, Georgia.
Gibson, Hugh S.	B.F.Paris	October, 1914–	c/o State Department, Washington, D. C.
Glenn, John L.	B.F.Wofford and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Sept., 1915, June–Oct., 1916.	Chester, So. Carolina.
Gray, Prentiss N.	B.F.California	February, 1916–	110 Market Street, San Francisco, Cal.
Green, Joseph C.	B.F.Princeton and Paris	Oct., 1915–July, 1917.	Avondale Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Gregory, Donald Munson	B.F.California	Oct., 1916, to withdrawal.	Berkeley, Cal.
Gregory, Warren	B.F.California	Nov., 1916, to withdrawal.	Berkeley, Cal.
Gwynn, William M.	B.F.California	July, 1916, to withdrawal.	1632 Ingraham Street, Los Angeles, Cal.
Hall, Guillermo F.	B.F.Morris Scientific School	Feb., 1916–Jan., 1917.	Austin, Texas.
Hall, William Chapman	B.F.Harvard	July, 1916–July, 1917.	Kent School, Kent, Conn.
Hamilton, Herbert F.	B.F.Amherst	Feb.–July 1916.	207 Minnesota Avenue, San José, Cal.
Harper, George M.	B.F.Princeton	May–June, 1915.	Mercer Street, Princeton, N. J.
Hawkins, Charles H.	B.F.Williams and Oxford	Dec., 1914–April, 1915.	Warwick, N. Y.
Heineman, Dannie N.	B.F.No. Carolina, Liége and Bonn	Beginning to withdrawal.	Brussels.
Hemphill, Alexander J.		November, 1914–	Guaranty Trust Co., 140 B'dway, N. Y. City.
Hollmann, Emil F.	B.F.Stanford and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Feb., 1915.	Oakland, Cal.
Honnold, William L.	....Michigan College of Mines	October, 1915–	Metropolitan Club, Fifth Ave. and 60th St., New York.
Hoover, Herbert C.	....Stanford	October, 1914–	Mills Building, San Francisco, Cal.
House, Roy T.	B.F.Miami University (Ohio)	Feb.–May, 1916.	327 West Symnes Street, Norman, Okla.
Hulse, William	B.F.	Beginning to Nov., 1916.	Brussels.
Humbert, Pierre	B.F.	April, 1915–May, 1917.	c/o Lazard Bros., N. Y.
Hunsiker, Millard		Oct., 1914–Oct., 1915.	33 Cornhill, London.
Hunt, Edward E.	B.F.Harvard	Dec., 1914–Oct., 1915.	27 West 44th Street, New York City.
Iliff, John G.	B.F.California	May–Sept., 1915.	1612 Edith Street, Berkeley, Cal.
Irwin, Will	....Stanford	October, 1914–	Players Club, New York City.
Jackson, George S.	B.F.Harvard	Nov., 1914–Nov., 1915.	462 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.

Member.	University.	Period of Service.	Permanent Home or Business Address.
Jackson, Robert A.	B.F.Harvard	May, 1915, to withdrawal.	462 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.
Jackson, William B.	B.F.Yale (Sheffield)	Dec., 1916, to withdrawal.	Silver Springs, Md.
Johnson, Amos D., Jr.	B.F.Kansas	Dec. 1914–July, 1915.	Rialto Building, Kansas City, Mo.
Jones, Thomas H.	B.F.Kentucky State and Oxford	Dec., 1914–April, 1915.	Arcadia, Florida.
Kellogg, Charlotte	B F.California	June, 1916–Dec., 1916.	Stanford University, Cal.
Kellogg, Vernon	B.F.Kansas, Cornell and Leipzig	June–Nov., 1915, July, 1916–	Stanford University, Cal.
Kite, St. Alban	B.F.Pennsylvania School of Social Science	Nov., 1915–August, 1916.	c/o Miss Elizabeth S. Kite, Morton, Pa.
Kitteredge, Tracy B.	B.F.California and Oxford	Dec., 1914–July, 1915, May, 1916–	Berkeley, Cal.
Knox, Newton B.	....Stanford	April, 1915–July, 1915.	
Langhorne, Marshall		November, 1914–	State Department, Washington, D. C.
Lathrop, Rev. Charles N.	B.F.California	Sept.–Dec., 1915.	All Saints' Cathedral, Milwaukee, Wis.
Leach, Dr. Charles N.	B.F.Stanford	Mar., 1916, to withdrawal.	c/o Dr. R. L. Wilbur, Lane Hospital, San Francisco, Cal.
Liefeld, Ernest Theophilus.	B.F.Yale (Sheffield), Leipzig, Freiburg	July, 1916, to withdrawal.	New Haven, Conn.
Lowdermilk, Walter C.	B.F.Arizona and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Jan., 1915.	Willcox, Arizona.
Lucas, Dr. William Palmer.	B.F.Western Reserve	May–August, 1916.	Berkeley, Cal.
Lucey, John F.	B.F.	January, 1915–	233 Broadway, New York City.
Lytle, R. Ridgley, Jr.	B.F.Princeton and Oxford	May–August, 1915.	300 W. 100th Street, New York City.
MacCarter, Robert		Nov., 1914–Nov., 1915.	165 Broadway, New York City.
Macloskie, Charles H.	B.F.Princeton	Beginning to Jan, 1915.	Brussels.
Malabre, Dr. Alfred L.	B.F.Georgetown	Jan.–April, 1916.	454 Fort Washington Avenue, New York City.
Mann, R. A.		Dec., 1914–July, 1915.	c/o J. F. Lucey Co., Broad Street House, London, E.C. 2.
Maurice, Arthur B	B.F.Princeton	Jan., 1917, to withdrawal.	Rahway, N. J.
Maverick, Robert V.	B.F.Princeton	Sept., 1916, to withdrawal.	San Antonio, Texas.
Mayreis, Louis J.	....Stanford	Jan.–June, 1916.	c/o Burma Mines, Ltd., 1 London Wall Buildings, London, E.C. 2.
Meert, Frederick W.	B.F.Brussels and Louvain	Beginning to withdrawal.	Brussels.
Morgan, Dudley S.	B.F.Harvard	June, 1916, to withdrawal.	Harvard Club, New York City.
Nelson, David T.	B.F.N. Dakota and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Oct. 1915.	Mayville, N. Dakota.
Oliver, Thomas E.	B.F.Harvard	Sept., 1915–May, 1916.	912 W. California Avenue, Urbane, Ill.

Member.	University.	Period of Service.	Permanent Home or Business Address.
Osborn, Earl D.	B.F.Princeton	Oct., 1915–April, 1916, Sep., 1916, to withdrawal.	40 E. 36th Street, New York City.
Page, Walter Hines		October, 1914–	American Embassy, London.
Paradise, Scott H.	B.F.Yale and Oxford	Dec., 1914–April, 1915.	Balliol College, Oxford.
Pate, Maurice	B.F.Princeton	July, 1916–June, 1917.	2053 Clermont Street, Denver, Colorado.
Percy, William A.	B.F.Sewanee and Harvard Law School	Dec., 1916, to withdrawal.	Greenville, Mississippi.
Pinchot, Gifford	Yale	April, 1915–May, 1915.	1617 Rhode Island Avenue, Washington, D. C.
Platt, Philip S.	B.F.Yale and Mass. Institute of Technology	June, 1916–Jan., 1917.	Scranton, Pa.
Poland, William B.	B.F.Mass. Institute of Technology.	September, 1915–	Engineers Club, New York, U. S. A.
Potter, Francis H.	B.F.Harvard	Feb.–Oct., 1916.	22 West 9th Street, New York City.
Potter, Philip B. K.	B.F.Harvard and Cornell	Feb., 1916, to withdrawal.	22 West 9th Street, New York City.
Pratt, Henry S.	B.F.Michigan, Leipzig, Freiburg, Geneva	Sept., 1916–Jan., 1917.	Haverford College, Haverford, Penn.
Richards, Lewis	B.F.Royal Conservatory of Music, Brussels	January, 1915–	368 Chaussee de Bruxelles, Forest-lez-Bruxelles.
Richardson, Gardner	B.F.Yale	May, 1915, to withdrawal.	Woodstock, Conn.
Rickard, Edgar	California	October, 1914–	120 Broadway, New York.
Seward, Samuel S., Jr.	B.F.Columbia and Oxford	June–Dec., 1915.	262 Kingsley Avenue, Palo Alto, Cal.
Shaler, Millard K.	Kansas	October, 1914–	3 Montagne du Parc, Brussels.
Sharp, William Graves		April, 1915–	Elyria, Ohio.
Simpson, John L.	B.F.California	Dec., 1915–July, 1917.	c/o D. Brookman, 833 Market Street, San Francisco, Cal.
Simpson, Richard H.	B.F.Indiana and Oxford	Dec., 1914–April, 1916.	243 Merrill Road, Indianapolis, Ind.
Skinner, Robert P.		October, 1914–	State Department, Washington, D. C.
Smith, Charles A.		March, 1915–Aug., 1915.	c/o Caucasian Copper Co., 81 Palmerston House, London, E.C.
Smith, Robinson	B.F.Yale	December, 1914–	195 Oxford Street, Hartford, Conn.
Spaulding, George F.	B.F.Arizona and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Jan., 1915.	Los Angeles, Cal.
Sperry, William H.	B.F.	Dec., 1914, to withdrawal.	c/o G. B. Sperry, Redwood City, Cal.
Stacy, T. Harwood	B.F.Texas	Dec., 1914–March, 1916.	Austin, Texas.
Stephens, F. Dorsey	B.F.California and Oxford	Jan., 1915–April, 1916.	Hollywood, Cal.
Stevenson, William C.	B.F.Princeton and Oxford	June–October, 1915.	c/o Rev. W. P. Stevenson, 111 N. Broadway, Yonkers, N. Y.
Stimson, Henry L.	Yale–Harvard—Harvard Law.	November, 1916–	32 Liberty Street, New York.

Member	University	Period of Service	Permanent Home or Business Address
Stockton, Gilchrist B.	B.F.Princeton and Oxford	April, 1915–Jan., 1916, July, 1916–Oct., 1916.	1754 Riverside Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida.
Stone, Carlos H.	B.F.Hamilton and Auburn Theol. Seminary	Dec., 1916, to withdrawal.	Cornwall-on-Hudson, N. Y.
Stratton, William W.	B.F.Utah and Oxford	Feb.-July, 1915.	Salt Lake City, Utah.
Straus, Oscar S.	....Columbia	November, 1915–	5 West 76th Street, New York.
Stubbs, Roscoe		November, 1914–	Abilene, Kansas.
Sullivan, William M.	B.F.Brown and Oxford	Dec., 1914–Jan., 1915.	Fall River, Mass.
Thurston, E. Coppée	B.F.Lehigh	Dec., 1914–Aug., 1916.	608 Crocker Bldg., San Francisco, Cal.
Thwaits, Frederick C.	B.F.Wisconsin and Harvard	Aug., 1916, to withdrawal.	405 Iron Block, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Torrey, Clare M.	B.F.California	Dec., 1915–Oct., 1916.	2208 Parker Street, Berkeley, Cal.
Trumbull, Frank		November, 1915–	61 Broadway, New York.
Tuck, William H.	B.F.Princeton	Sept., 1915–Dec., 1916.	c/o Judge S. P. Tuck, San Stefano, Alexandria, Egypt.
Van Dyke, Henry	....Princeton	Nov., 1914–April, 1917.	Princeton, N. J.
Van Hee, Julius A.	B.F.	Jan., 1915, to withdrawal.	State Department, Washington, D. C.
Van Schaick, J. Broadhead	B.F.	Sept., 1915–Sept., 1916.	Huntington Station, Long Island, N. Y.
‡Warren, Robert H.	B.F.Yankton and Oxford	Dec., 1914–May, 1915.	
Wellington, Laurence C.	B.F.Williams and Oxford	Dec., 1914–May, 1915, Aug., 1915–Sept., 1916.	34 Amity Street, Amherst, Mass.
White, John Beaver		October, 1914–	120 Broadway, New York.
Whiting, Almon C.	B.F.Mass. Normal Art School	Sept., 1916, to withdrawal.	Toledo Museum of Art, Toledo, Ohio.
Whitlock, Brand	B.F.	October, 1914–	State Department, Washington, D. C.
Whitney, Caspar	B.F.Yale	May, 1915–April, 1916.	Oakby House, Bronxville, N. Y.
Wickes, Francis C.	B.F.Williams and Harvard Law School	Aug., 1915–June, 1917.	47 Fitahugh Street, Rochester, N. Y.
Williams, Edgar	B.F.Cornell	June, 1916–Feb., 1917.	141 St. Mark's Place, New Brighton, N. Y.
Williams, Dr. Percy D.	B.F.Columbia	Dec., 1914–Jan., 1915.	249 West 72nd Street, New York.
Withington, Robert	B.F.Harvard	March–December, 1916.	35 Bay State Road, Boston, Mass.
Young, Carl A.		Dec., 1914–June, 1916.	c/o Lucey Mfg. Corpn., Woolworth Building, 233 Broadway, N. Y.

* Lost on *S.S. Lusitania*, May 7th, 1915. † Died at Brussels, December 27th, 1916. ‡ Died at Bordeaux, November, 1916.

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